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I.

INTRODUCTION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d), as well as Supreme Court precedent,
remand orders in removed cases are immune from appellate review when they
are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Until recently, all appellate
courts that had addressed the issue had concluded that a district court’s
discretionary decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c) and remand the supplemental claims does not constitute a
remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore is reviewable on
appeal.1
In 2007, however, the Supreme Court held in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Services, Inc.2 that where a district court characterizes a remand as
subject matter jurisdictional and that characterization is colorable, the remand
order is not subject to appellate review.3 Although the case did not involve the
remand of supplemental claims, the Court stated the following in dictum: “It is
far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined
the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of §
1447(c) and § 1447(d).”4
Then, in HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, relying on Powerex,
became the first circuit to hold that Cohill remands6 fall within § 1447(c) and (d)

1. See infra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of appellate courts’ remands of supplemental claims prior
to the Powerex decision.
2. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007).
3. Id. at 2418.
4. Id. at 2418–19.
5. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
6. A remand that occurs after a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c) is often referred to as a “remand under § 1367(c),” or a “§ 1367(c) remand.” These remands
are also referred to as “Cohill remands” because the Supreme Court held in Carnegie-Mellon
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and therefore are not subject to appellate review.7 The HIF Bio court reasoned
that “because every § 1367(c) remand necessarily involves a predicate finding
that the claims at issue lack an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, a
remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably
characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”8 On
October 14, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in HIF Bio to resolve
the circuit split created by the Federal Circuit.9
This Article examines whether the HIF Bio decision was correct and
ultimately concludes that it was not. Part II reviews the history of supplemental
jurisdiction and § 1447(c) and (d). Part II also explains the relationship between
§ 1447(c) and (d) and explicates the pertinent Supreme Court and court of
appeals precedent. Part III.A begins by explaining how some postremoval events
can lead to remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the current
version of § 1447(c). Part III.B then argues that a district court’s decision to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is not the type of postremoval event
that results in a jurisdictional defect and thereby renders Cohill remands
unreviewable on appeal. More specifically, Part III.B contends that the HIF Bio
court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal in that case
for two reasons. First, the Federal Circuit misunderstood the language of § 1367
and confused the existence of judicial power with the discretionary decision
whether to exercise such power. Second, the Federal Circuit incorrectly applied
the Powerex test to the remand order in HIF Bio. Part III.B concludes that the
Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that the Federal
Circuit must review the remand order on the merits.
Part III.C argues that even if the Supreme Court determines that Cohill
remands are remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that does not
University v. Cohill that district courts could remand pendent claims in removed cases instead of
dismiss them. 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988). See also infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the Cohill decision.
At the time Cohill was decided, there was no statutory basis for the remand of pendent claims.
Instead, the power to remand derived from the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Cohill, 484 U.S. at
356. When the supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted, it did not (and still does not) provide for
the remand or dismissal of supplemental claims once a district court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over them. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, there is no question
that the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to removed cases and district courts can remand
supplemental claims in removed cases if they decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Because the district court’s remand authority does not derive
from § 1367, it (presumably) continues to derive from Cohill. Thus, this Article refers to the remand of
claims after a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as Cohill remands.
7. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667.
8. Id.
9. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). The Petition
for Certiorari phrased the question presented as follows:
Whether a district court’s order remanding a case to state court following its discretionary
decision to decline to exercise the supplemental jurisdiction accorded to federal courts under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is properly held to be a remand for a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) so that such remand order is barred from any appellate review by
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
Id.
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automatically mean that they fall within § 1447(c) and are unreviewable under §
1447(d). Finally, Part III.D explores the consequences that will result if the
Court (erroneously) concludes both that Cohill remands are based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and that they are immune from appellate review
under § 1447(c) and (d).
II.
A.

BACKGROUND OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND § 1447(C) AND (D)
Supplemental Jurisdiction
1.

History

The history of supplemental jurisdiction is well documented10 and is
recounted only in relevant part here. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
which codifies the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
under the label of supplemental jurisdiction.11 Pursuant to these doctrines, if a
district court had an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction over at least
one claim, then the jurisdictional statutes12 “implicitly authorized supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims between the same parties arising out of the
same Article III case or controversy.”13 The “leading modern case for this
principle”14 is United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.15

10. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–57 (2005) (discussing
previous Supreme Court cases dealing with supplemental jurisdiction); see also id. at 579–84
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining prior Supreme Court holdings regarding supplemental
jurisdiction); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute—A Constitutional
and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 852–89 (1992) (discussing Federal Courts Study
Committee and prior case law which led to supplemental jurisdiction statute); John B. Oakley, Recent
Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 757–63 (1991) (discussing doctrines in place preceding
supplemental jurisdiction statute); James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 116–20 (1999) (discussing origins of
supplemental jurisdiction).
11. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997). Pendent jurisdiction
“applied only in federal-question cases and allowed plaintiffs to attach nonfederal claims to their
jurisdiction-qualifying claims.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 590–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In
contrast, ancillary jurisdiction “applied primarily, although not exclusively, in diversity cases and
typically involved claims by a defending party haled into court against his will.” Id. at 591 (internal
quotation marks and alterations in original omitted). Thus, prior to the enactment of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, courts regularly exercised ancillary jurisdiction “over compulsory counterclaims,
impleader claims, cross-claims among defendants, and claims of parties who intervened of right.” Id. at
581 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); id. § 1332(a)(1) (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of
different States. . . .”).
13. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 556 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966)) (emphasis added); see also id. at 554 (“In order for a federal court to invoke
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In Gibbs, a pendent jurisdiction case, the plaintiff filed an action in federal
court alleging violations of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)
and state law against the defendant.16 The district court had federal question
jurisdiction over the LMRA claims17 but lacked diversity jurisdiction over the
state claim.18 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the district court had
the “power” to hear the whole case because the district court had an
independent basis of jurisdiction over the federal claim and the state and federal
claims were sufficiently related.19 The Gibbs Court emphasized, however, that
“pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right. Its
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise
jurisdiction over state claims.”20 Thus, although the district court may have the
power to hear both the federal and state claims, “[t]hat power need not be
exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.”21

supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, it must first have original jurisdiction over at least one claim in
the action.”).
14. Id. at 552.
15. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
16. Gibbs, 383 U.S at 717–18.
17. See id. at 717, 728 (stating that claims against defendant under § 303 of LMRA “generally
were substantial”).
18. Id. at 720, 722 (stating that jurisdiction over state law claim was based on doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction and that diversity jurisdiction over state claim was absent).
19. See id. at 728 (“[T]he state and federal claims arose from the same nucleus of operative fact
and reflected alternative remedies.”); id. at 725 (stating that if federal claim has “substance sufficient
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court” and “state and federal claims . . . derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact,” then “there is power in [the] federal courts to hear the whole”
(emphasis omitted)).
20. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The Gibbs Court gave several examples of when a district court
should or could decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Id. First, a district court should avoid
“[n]eedless decisions of state law . . . both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. Second, “if the federal
claims [were] dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state
claims should be dismissed as well.” Id. Third, “if it appear[ed] that the state issues substantially
predominate[d] . . . the state claims [could] be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. Finally, a district court
could decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction if there were “reasons independent of jurisdictional
considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief,
that . . . justif[ied] separating state and federal claims for trial.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Although the
language used by the Gibbs Court “strongly suggested” that the district court should always dismiss
the state law claims “if the federal claim was dismissed before trial, many courts treated this
circumstance as simply one element to be considered in making the ultimate discretionary decision.”
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 75 (4th ed. 2005) (footnote omitted); see also
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970) (holding that jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law
claims continues even after plaintiff’s federal claim becomes moot). See infra notes 203, 230 for a
discussion of district courts’ exercise of pendent jurisdiction in these situations.
21. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see also id. at 727 (“The question of power will ordinarily be resolved
on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has been properly assumed is one which
remains open throughout the litigation.” (emphasis added)); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–53 (2005) (“Gibbs confirmed that the District Court had the additional power
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After the decision in Gibbs, the Court took issue with the common law
nature of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and the failure of the Gibbs Court to
“mention, let alone come to grips with . . . the bedrock principle that federal
courts have no jurisdiction without statutory authorization.”22 Although the
Court reaffirmed Gibbs and the exercise of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
over claims between the same parties where at least one claim had an
independent basis of jurisdiction, the Court refused to extend Gibbs and
interpret the jurisdictional statutes to “authorize supplemental jurisdiction over
additional claims involving other parties.”23
For example, in Finley v. United States,24 the Court refused to permit the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction where the plaintiff asserted a federal claim
against one defendant and state law claims against the other defendants.25 The
federal claim had its own basis of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but the
state law claims did not fall within the district court’s diversity jurisdiction and no
statute explicitly provided for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
them.26 Because there was no specific statutory authorization for the district
court to assert jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Finley Court held that
the lower court did not have power to hear them.27
In reaching its decision, the Finley Court noted that Congress could change
the result in Finley by passing a statute that authorized the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by and against parties joined to an action
that did not have an independent basis of jurisdiction.28 Congress responded by
enacting § 1367.29 The statute does “not acknowledge any distinction between
(though not the obligation) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that arose
from the same Article III case or controversy.”).
22. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 553 (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989)).
23. Id. at 557 (citing Finley, 490 U.S. at 549, 556; Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300–01
(1973); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939)).
24. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
25. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546, 555.
26. Id. at 547–55.
27. Id. at 555.
28. Id. at 556.
29. This statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on
section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24
of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
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pendent . . . and . . . ancillary jurisdiction.”30 Section 1367(a) provides that unless
another federal statute or subsection (b) or (c) applies, when a federal court has
“original jurisdiction” over at least one claim in an action, it “shall have”
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that are part of the same Article
III case or controversy but do not by themselves fall within the court’s original
jurisdiction.31 Section 1367(a) also overrules the result in Finley by providing that
supplemental jurisdiction “include[s] claims that involve the joinder or
intervention of additional parties.”32 Section 1367(b) “qualifies the broad rule of
§ 1367(a)” by creating specific exceptions to § 1367(a).33
In addition, supplemental jurisdiction, “‘is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff’s right.’”34 Section 1367(c) “confirms the discretionary nature of
supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district
courts can refuse its exercise.”35 Specifically, § 1367(c) provides that “district
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a)” where
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other
claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the
dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for
a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
30. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005); see also id. (“Though
the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed separately as a historical matter, the
Court has recognized that the doctrines are ‘two species of the same generic problem.’” (quoting
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978))).
31. Id. at 558–59; see also City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 167 (1997)
(“The whole point of supplemental jurisdiction is to allow the district courts to exercise . . . jurisdiction
over claims as to which original jurisdiction is lacking.”).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 558 (noting that holding in
Finley was overturned by § 1367).
33. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 560. Section 1367(b) applies only to diversity cases and to
those claims over which there is no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. It “withholds
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs proposed to be joined as indispensable parties
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, or who seek to intervene pursuant to Rule 24,” and
“explicitly excludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against defendants joined under” Rules 14,
19, 20, and 24. Id.; see also id. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “§ 1367(b) stops plaintiffs
from circumventing § 1332’s jurisdictional requirements by using another’s claim as a hook to add a
claim that the plaintiff could not have brought in the first instance”).
34. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
35. Id. at 173.
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district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.36
According to the Supreme Court, § 1367(c) “reflects the understanding that,
when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”37
2.

Supplemental Jurisdiction and Removal

The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides that defendants
may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction.”38 Accordingly, removal is proper
only if the entire case “originally could have been filed in federal court.”39
Although the text of the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not indicate
whether it applies to removed cases, the Supreme Court has said that § 1367
“applies with equal force to cases removed to federal court as to cases initially
filed there.”40 Thus, taking sections 1367 and 1441(a) together, when an action is
removed the district court must have an independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction over at least one claim, and any claims that lack an independent basis
of subject matter jurisdiction must fall within the court’s supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(a).41 In addition, although neither § 1367 nor any other

36. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (stating that courts may
opt against invoking supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims based on several factors, including
specific circumstances of case, type of claims available under state law, characteristics of state law, and
correlation between state and federal law claims).
37. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 (1988)).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
39. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163; see, e.g., Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.
28, 33 (2002) (stating that defendants must demonstrate original subject matter jurisdiction for proper
removal to federal court); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840 (1989) (per curiam)
(noting that removal to federal court is not proper unless case could have been brought there
originally).
40. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 165; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 591 n.11 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“There was no disagreement in [International
College of Surgeons], and there is none now, that . . . § 1367(a) is properly read to authorize the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in removed cases.”).
41. It is important to distinguish between supplemental claims that fall within § 1367(a) and are
removable pursuant to § 1441(a) and claims that are removable pursuant to § 1441(c). To fall within §
1367(a), of course, a claim without an independent basis of jurisdiction must be part of the same
Article III case or controversy as a claim with an independent basis of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”). If these requirements are satisfied
and § 1367(b) does not withdraw jurisdiction over the supplemental claim, then the case is removable
under § 1441(a) because it could have been filed in federal court originally.
In contrast, § 1441(c) provides for the removal of “otherwise non-removable claims or causes of
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statute explicitly authorizes the remand of supplemental claims, there is no
question that district courts may remand state law claims if they decline to
exercise their supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c).42
B.

§ 1447(c) and (d)
1.

Statutory History

Like the history of supplemental jurisdiction, the history of § 1447(c) and
(d) is well documented43 and is recounted here in pertinent part only. Congress
first created the right of removal in the Judiciary Act of 1789,44 and it has existed
ever since.45 In contrast, although lower courts have always remanded cases
when they lacked subject matter jurisdiction,46 it was not until 1875 that

action” that are joined with “a separate and independent claim or cause of action” that falls within
§1331. Id. § 1441(c). As Professor Dodson has pointed out, “[t]here is no comparable statutory
authorization of original jurisdiction because supplemental jurisdiction applies only to claims that are
not separate and independent.” Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
55, 62 (2008). Thus, unlike § 1441(a), § 1441(c) permits the removal of “case[s] that could not have
been heard in federal court originally.” Id. Furthermore, as many scholars have suggested, “[§] 1441(c)
may be unconstitutional if it permits the removal of claims that bear no relation to any federal
question and that are between nondiverse defendants.” FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 66 &
n.49; see also Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An Unsurveyed
Frontier of Congress’ Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 321–25 (1993) (discussing relationship
between § 1367 and § 1441(c)).
42. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172–74 (indicating that district courts are not required
to hear state law claims).
43. E.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343–50 (1976), overruled in part
by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714–15 (1996); Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d
1249, 1254–60 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review of case which has
been removed on grounds not authorized by § 1447(c)); Joan Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the
Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 863,
887–93 (1990) (discussing history of removal and remand statutes); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking
Review of Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 87–
108 (1994) (discussing history of statutory bar on appellate review of remand orders); David D. Siegel,
Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (2006) (noting changes to removal
statute).
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80 (repealed 1911) (authorizing removal “if a
suit [were] commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit
is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the . . . sum or value of
five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs”).
45. Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41
VAND. L. REV. 923, 926 (1988) (citing 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶
0.156[1], at 13–14 (2d ed. 1987)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided
by . . . Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court . . . for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
46. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 89–90 (stating that although Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
specifically authorize remands, circuit courts of time remanded cases due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or because of defendant’s failure to comply with statutory removal procedures).

1076

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Congress expressly authorized remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.47
Congress did not prohibit appellate review of remand orders until 1887.48
47. Id. at 90, 92; Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) (2006)) (“[I]f, in any suit . . . removed . . . to a circuit court . . . it shall appear to the satisfaction
of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been . . . removed thereto, that such suit does not
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit
court . . . , the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall . . . remand it to the court
from which it was removed as justice may require . . . .”).
48. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 100; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)) (“Whenever any cause shall be removed . . . , and the circuit court shall
decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded . . . , such remand
shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision . . . so
remanding such cause shall be allowed.”). A few years after this provision was enacted, the Supreme
Court held that it “precluded review of remand orders not only by writ of error and appeal, but also by
writ of mandamus.” Wasserman, supra note 43, at 102–03 (citing Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160
U.S. 556, 582 (1896); In re Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890)).
Interestingly, although the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not specifically authorize appellate review of
remand orders, until 1875 “the Supreme Court reviewed remand orders entered by the circuit courts
on writs of error or appeal” without statutory authorization. Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted). In 1875,
when Congress authorized remand of actions for lack of jurisdiction, it also provided for appellate
review of remand orders. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (“[T]he order of [a] circuit court . . . remanding [a] cause to . . . State court shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal . . . .”). According to Professor
Wasserman, no legislative history for the appellate review provision has been found and therefore the
reasons for its enactment are unclear. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 92.
Professor Wasserman has noted, however, that Congress expanded the removal jurisdiction of the
circuit courts in 1875 by authorizing the removal of federal question cases. Id. (discussing Act of Mar.
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71). She has suggested that Congress added the appellate review
provision to the removal statutes because “once Congress granted the federal courts removal
jurisdiction of federal question cases, [it] wanted to ensure that any decisions that the circuit courts
made interpreting the scope of federal question jurisdiction would be subject to review by the
Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Professor Wasserman has also suggested that another, “less
likely” possibility is that “Congress may have enacted [the appellate review] section to legislatively
overrule” a recent Supreme Court case which “had held that a circuit court order remanding a
removed action to state court was not a final order from which a writ of error would lie.” Id. at 93
(discussing Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507 (1875)).
In addition to expanding the removal jurisdiction of the circuit courts in 1875, Congress also
significantly expanded the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts. See id. at 91–92 (citing Act of Mar.
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470). The enlargement of the circuit courts’ original and removal
jurisdiction resulted in docket congestion in both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court.
Wasserman, supra note 43, at 94–96. Thus, in 1887, Congress reversed direction and restricted the
scope of the circuit courts’ original and removal jurisdiction. Id. at 99–100 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 373, §§ 1, 6, 24 Stat. 552, 552–53, 555). Congress also “repealed the provision authorizing appellate
review of remand orders” and, for the first time, prohibited review of remand orders by appeal or writ
of error. Id. at 100 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, §§ 1, 6, 24 Stat. 552, 553, 555).
The precise reasons for the inclusion of the ban on appellate review in the 1887 statute are
uncertain. Id. (stating that “[n]o legislative history exists to explain why the Senate included this
provision” in bill that Congress eventually passed). At the time, however, the Supreme Court—rather
than an intermediate appellate court—heard appeals from remand orders. Id. at 90 n.28 (citing
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 81, 84 for proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court had
appellate jurisdiction to review ‘final judgments and decrees’ of the circuit courts”). Thus, the “most
likely” explanation is that “Congress . . . wanted to relieve the Supreme Court’s overload directly, not
merely indirectly, by reducing the circuit courts’ docket.” Wasserman, supra note 43, at 101.
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Congress enacted the precursors to the current versions of § 1447(c) and (d)
in 1948 and 1949, respectively.49 The 1948 version of § 1447(c), which until 1949
was codified at subsection (e), provided for remand where a case was “removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction.”50 In 1988, Congress deleted
“improvident” removal as a basis for remand under § 1447(c) and provided
instead that “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal
procedure must be made within 30 days after . . . removal.”51 The 1988
amendment also required remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”52 Congress last
amended § 1447(c) in 1996,53 and the statute currently states in pertinent part:
“A motion to remand . . . on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after . . . removal . . . . If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”54 Legislative history indicates, and
lower courts have concluded, that the primary purpose of the 1988 and 1996
amendments to § 1447(c) was to limit the amount of time a plaintiff had to file a
remand motion on any basis other than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.55
Professor Wasserman also has suggested two other possible explanations for the enactment of the
ban on appellate review of remand orders. First, “Congress may have withdrawn appellate jurisdiction
over remand orders to eliminate one of the most powerful weapons in the corporate arsenal: the
ability of a corporation to exhaust a plaintiff’s resources or stamina by appealing a remand order to
the Supreme Court in distant Washington, D.C.” Id. Second, the appellate bar was in the same
paragraph of the statute that authorized remand “if some defendants would not face prejudice [in state
court] or if the plaintiff’s affidavit alleging local prejudice [in state court] was not well-founded.” Id.
Thus, Congress may have intended to help relieve the Supreme Court’s docket congestion by limiting
appellate review only in this narrow class of cases where “if the circuit court erred in remanding . . . ,
the parties opposing remand would face little prejudice.” Id.
49. In 1948, Congress revised the Judicial Code and “consolidated and recodified” the removal
statutes. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 939 (1948)). The legislation, however, was replete with drafting errors. Wasserman, supra
note 43, at 103 n.86. For example, Congress inadvertently omitted the provision barring appellate
review of remand orders. Id. at 103 & n.86. In order to correct its mistakes, including its omission of
the prohibition on appellate review of remand orders, Congress again amended the removal provisions
in 1949. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1254; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d)). The legislative history of the 1949 Act indicates that the new § 1447(d) was added
“to remove any doubt that the former law as to the finality of an order to remand to a State court is
continued.” H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 15 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1268.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (Supp. III 1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
51. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title X, §
1016(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (emphasis added).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. United States District Court: Removal Procedure, Pub. L. No. 104-219, 110 Stat. 3022 (1996).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added).
55. While the 1948 version of § 1447(c) joined the bases for remand—improvident removal and
lack of subject matter jurisdiction—with the conjunction “and,” the 1988 version explicitly provided
for two separate bases of remand: defects in removal procedure and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254 n.7, 1256 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that 1988
amendment to § 1447(c) ratified lower courts’ understanding that Congress intended phrase
“improvidently and without jurisdiction” in 1948 statute to be read in disjunctive). The 1988
amendment also made explicit the lower courts’ understanding that Congress intended remand based
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The 1949 version of § 1447(d) read: “An order remanding a case . . . is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”56 Congress amended § 1447(d) once in 1964
to permit appellate review of remand orders in civil rights cases,57 but otherwise
has left § 1447(d) alone. The current version of the statute provides: “An order
remanding a case . . . is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an
order remanding a case . . . pursuant to section 1443 [(the removal provision for
civil rights cases)] . . . shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”58 According
to the Supreme Court, the purpose of § 1447(d)’s ban on appellate review of
remand orders is to prevent the delay caused by “protracted litigation of
jurisdictional issues.”59

on “improvident” removal to mean remand based on defects in removal procedure. Id. at 1254–56.
Thus, the “primary change” effected by the 1988 amendment “was the imposition of the 30-day
limitation on raising motions to remand based on procedural defects.” Id. at 1256 n.13.
Congress apparently believed that the 1988 revision to § 1447(c) was ambiguous and had caused
confusion in the lower courts. H.R. REP. NO. 104-799, at 1–2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3417, 3417–18. Thus, according to the House Report that accompanied the 1996 amendment, § 1447(c)
was amended to “clarif[y] . . . the intent of Congress that [the] 30-day limit applies to any ‘defect’ other
than the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 156 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 1988 and 1996 amendments to § 1447(c)
“focused on creating and clarifying time limits concerning when a plaintiff can seek a remand
following removal from state court”).
56. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title IX, § 901, 78 Stat. 241, 266. The
amendment apparently “was designed to ensure that defendants in civil rights cases would have access
to a federal forum, even if the district court erroneously remanded the suit to state court, and to
ensure the development of a uniform federal law regarding civil rights removal jurisdiction.”
Wasserman, supra note 43, at 105 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 105–06 (stating that Congress
members’ discussion of 1964 amendment to § 1447(d) centered on providing civil rights defendants
with federal forum and protecting them from “hostile state courts”).
Congress has also expressly granted the United States the right to appeal remand orders in cases
involving the property of Native Americans, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 487(d) (2006), and has granted both the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) the
right to appeal remand orders, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C) (2006) (granting FDIC right to appeal); 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3)(C) (giving appeal rights to RTC). Most recently, Congress has granted appellate
courts authority to review district court orders granting or denying remand motions in cases removed
under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) as long as the notice of appeal is filed within the
proper timeframe. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); see also Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating that purpose of § 1453(c)(1) “‘is to develop a body of appellate law interpreting [CAFA]
without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46)).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
59. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976) (citing United States v.
Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)), overruled in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
714–15 (1996); see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007)
(stating that policy behind § 1447(d) is “avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits
questions”); Wasserman, supra note 43, at 130–40 (arguing that § 1447(d) does not serve purposes that
historically were or currently are attributed to it); Wasserman, supra note 43, at 139–40, 150 (arguing
that potential benefits of § 1447(d) do not serve as justification for bar on review of remand orders).

2008]

REMAND AND APPELLATE REVIEW

1079

2. The Relationship Between § 1447(c) and (d): Thermtron Products, Inc.
v. Hermansdorfer
Although the plain language of § 1447(d) appears to immunize all remand
orders (except those in civil rights cases) from appellate review, the Supreme
Court has rejected such an interpretation of the statute.60 In Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,61 the district court remanded a case because its
docket was congested, the case could not be tried in the near future, and the
plaintiffs had a “right to a forum of their choice and . . . to a speedy decision on
the merits.”62 The defendants petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition, but the court denied the petition after concluding that,
under § 1447(d), it “had no jurisdiction to review [the remand] order or to issue
mandamus.”63
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that § 1447(c) and (d) “must
be construed together.”64 This meant “that only remand orders issued under §
1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein . . . [were] immune from
review under § 1447(d).”65 Because the district court had not remanded the case
on a § 1447(c) ground66 but instead had remanded “a properly removed case on
grounds that [it] had no authority to consider,” § 1447(d) did not apply and the
remand order was reviewable on appeal.67 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
not only interpreted § 1447(d) to bar appellate review of § 1447(c) remands, but
also indicated that district courts had the power to issue remand orders only on
the grounds specified in § 1447(c) and that remands on any other ground were
impermissible.68
60. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 337–53. In a case decided before Thermtron, the Supreme
Court held that where a district court dismisses a third-party claim and then remands the case for lack
of jurisdiction, the order of dismissal is reviewable on appeal because it precedes the remand order “in
logic and in fact.” Waco v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 142–44 (1934); see also Wasserman,
supra note 43, at 112 (arguing that Waco Court did not create exception to bar on appellate review of
remand orders, but did recognize review of merits decisions preceding remand orders).
61. 423 U.S. 336 (1976), overruled in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714–
15 (1996).
62. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 339–41.
63. Id. at 341–42.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 346. The Court further held that a § 1447(c) remand order is immune from appellate
review regardless of “whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court.” Id.
at 351; see also Gravitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1977) (per curiam) (holding §
1447(c) remand immune from appellate review).
66. Because Thermtron is a 1976 decision, it was decided under the 1948 version of § 1447(c).
Thus, the Thermtron Court’s conclusion that the case was not remanded under § 1447(c) meant that
the case had not been “removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.” Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423
U.S. at 342, 351–52.
67. Id. at 351–52; see also id. at 344 (stating that district court’s basis for remand was “plainly
irrelevant to whether [it] would have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in that court,
to the removability of a case from the state court under § 1441, and hence to the question whether
[the] cause was [improperly] removed [under § 1447(c)]”).
68. Id. at 352 (“[T]his Court has not yet construed [§ 1447(d)] so as to extinguish the power of an
appellate court to correct a district court that has not merely erred in applying the requisite provision
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Although the Court decided Thermtron under the 1948 version of § 1447(c)
and that statute has been amended twice since the Thermtron decision, the Court
has never indicated that the amendments affected Thermtron’s holding that §
1447(c) and (d) must be read together. Indeed, since Thermtron the Court has
stated repeatedly (most recently in 2007) that only § 1447(c) remands are
immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).69 In contrast, however, the
Court’s suggestion in Thermtron that district courts have authority to remand
only on the grounds set forth in § 1447(c) has not withstood the test of time.

for remand but has remanded a case on grounds not specified in [§ 1447(c)] and not touching the
propriety of the removal.”); see also id. at 351 (“[W]e are not convinced that Congress ever intended
to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal
by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by
[§1447(c)].”).
The Thermtron Court also held that because “an order remanding a removed action does not
represent a final judgment” that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “the writ of mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to require the District Court to entertain [a] remanded action.” Thermtron Prods.,
Inc., 423 U.S. at 352–53. The Court later disavowed this holding in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 714–15 (1996). See infra note 90 for a discussion of the Quackenbush opinion.
69. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2007); Osborn v.
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 240 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006);
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12; Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995).
In Powerex Corp., the Court addressed the question of how the 1988 and 1996 amendments to §
1447(c) affected Thermtron’s gloss on the statute. 127 S. Ct. at 2415–16. The Court recognized that
under Thermtron, the application of § 1447(d) was limited to remands where a case had been removed
“improvidently and without jurisdiction.” Id. at 2415. The Court also recognized that when the 1988
version of § 1447(c) was in effect, it had “interpreted § 1447(d) to preclude review only of remands for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure.” Id. at 2416 (citing
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12; Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127–28). The Court then
stated: “Although § 1447(c) was amended . . . again in 1996, we will assume . . . that the amendment
was immaterial to Thermtron’s gloss on § 1447(d), so that the prohibition on appellate review remains
limited to remands [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure]”
under § 1447(c). Id.
The Thermtron decision, of course, has not been without its critics. Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Thermtron primarily on the ground that the plain language of § 1447(d) bars appellate review of all
remand orders, including the one at issue in Thermtron, except those issued in cases removed under §
1443. He argued that “characterizing the bar to review [in § 1447(d)] as limited to only those remand
orders entered pursuant to . . . § 1447(c)” ignored the purpose behind § 1447(d), Thermtron Prods.,
Inc., 423 U.S. at 355–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), which is “to prevent the additional delay which a
removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsideration of an order of remand,” id. at 354.
Scholars have also criticized Thermtron. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 43, at 115–19 (suggesting that
Thermtron Court manipulated precedent to reach its conclusion that § 1447(d) applies only to remands
under § 1447(c), arguing that Thermtron Court created “test for reviewability of remand orders” that
is problematic for lower courts to apply, and contending that Thermtron is difficult to square with
Supreme Court’s later decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988)).
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The Supreme Court and Remand of Supplemental Claims
1.

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill

In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,70 the Supreme Court held that
district courts, once the anchor claim on which federal question jurisdiction was
based has been eliminated, can exercise their discretion to remand pendent state
law claims if they could have dismissed the claims under the same
circumstances.71 This conclusion appeared to be irreconcilable with Thermtron
because nothing in the language of § 1447(c) indicated that district courts had the
power to remand supplemental claims instead of dismissing them.72
The Court, however, distinguished Thermtron on the ground that it
involved “a clearly impermissible remand” since the district court had
jurisdiction over the case and had no authority to refuse to exercise its
jurisdiction due to a crowded docket.73 In contrast, the Cohill case involved
pendent state law claims and the district court had “undoubted discretion” to
decline to hear them under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction set forth in
Gibbs.74 The only question was whether the district court could decline to
exercise its pendent jurisdiction by remanding the state law claims instead of
dismissing them, and the Cohill Court concluded that it could.75 The Court
reasoned that “[t]he discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with
cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine.”76
Of particular importance here, the Court emphasized in a footnote that the
remand power it had recognized did not derive from § 1447(c), but instead
“derive[d] from the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and applie[d] only to cases
involving pendent claims.”77 Thus, according to the Court, “the remand
authority conferred by [§ 1447(c)] and the remand authority conferred by the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at all.”78

70. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
71. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 354.
72. As one court cleverly explained: “Thermtron h[eld] that § 1447(d) does not mean what it says
. . . . [t]hen . . . [Cohill] held that Thermtron does not mean what it says.” In re Amoco Petroleum
Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 355–56.
74. Id. at 356 (“[A]n entirely different situation is presented when the district court has clear
power to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Thermtron therefore does not control the decision in this
case.”).
75. Id. at 356–57.
76. Id. at 357.
77. Id. at 355 n.11.
78. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 355 n.11.
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Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca

In Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,79 the petitioner filed a notice of
removal pursuant to the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and
the general removal statute, § 1441(a).80 Although the bankruptcy court found
that removal was proper under § 1441(a), on appeal the district court found that
removal was untimely under both statutes and ultimately remanded the case to
state court.81 The Sixth Circuit held that both § 1447(d) and § 1452(b) insulated
the remand order from appellate review and dismissed the appeal.82 The
question before the Court was whether § 1447(d) barred appellate review of “a
district court order remanding a bankruptcy case to state court on grounds of
untimely removal.”83 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that because the
district court “remanded this case on grounds of untimely removal, precisely the
type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c),” § 1447(d) precluded
appellate review of the court’s remand order.84 The Court also made it clear that
“[§] 1447(d) applies ‘not only to remand orders made in suits removed under
[the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed
under any other statutes, as well.’”85 Thus, under Things Remembered, § 1447(d)
must be read in pari materia with all removal statutes.
Justice Kennedy wrote separately, however, to express his understanding
that the Court’s holding was “not intended to bear upon the reviewability of
Cohill orders.”86 He apparently was concerned that appellate courts would
understand Things Remembered to mean that remand orders based on statutory
authority are immune from review under § 1447(d), but remand orders that lack
statutory authorization—such as those permitted in Cohill—are not. Thus,
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Cohill Court “did not find it necessary to
decide” whether § 1447(d) would bar review of Cohill remand orders,87 but
decided only that district courts could remand pendent claims rather than dismiss
them. Although he recognized that appellate courts had “relied on Thermtron to
hold that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of § 1447(c) remands but not remands

79. 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
80. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 126.
81. Id. at 126–27 & n.2.
82. Id. at 127.
83. Id. at 125.
84. Id. at 128.
85. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 128 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752
(1946)). The Court stated that “[a]bsent a clear statutory command to the contrary, [it] assume[s] that
Congress is ‘aware of the universality of th[e] practice’ of denying appellate review of remand orders
when Congress creates a new ground for removal.” Id. (quoting Rice, 327 U.S. at 752). Because
Congress did not expressly indicate in § 1452 that it “intended [the] statute to be the exclusive
provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy” and there was no “reason to infer from §
1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy cases from its coverage,” § 1447(d) applied and
the remand order at issue was not subject to appellate review. Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 130.
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ordered under Cohill,”88 he ended his concurrence by stating: “The issues raised
by those decisions are not before us.”89
3.

Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.

Despite Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Things Remembered, later in the
same term the Court held in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.90 that §
1447(d) is inapplicable to abstention-based remands and therefore they are
reviewable on appeal.91 Significantly, abstention-based remands, like Cohill
remands, are not expressly provided for in § 1447(c) or any other statute.
Instead, the power to abstain derives from “the historic discretion exercised by
federal courts ‘sitting in equity’” to decline to exercise their jurisdiction.92 Citing
88. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 130.
89. Id.
90. 517 U.S. 706 (1996). In Quackenbush, the California insurance commissioner sued Allstate
Insurance Company in state court “seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate’s alleged breach of
certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate’s obligations under those
agreements.” 517 U.S. at 709. Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case and filed a
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. The commissioner then moved
for remand, arguing that the district court should abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943) because its resolution of the case might interfere with California’s regulation of the insurance
industry. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 709. Specifically, the commissioner indicated that there was “a
hotly disputed question of state law” involved in the case, and that this question was already “pending
before the state courts.” Id. The district court remanded the case primarily because it was concerned
that the state and federal courts might rule differently on the disputed issue of state law and thereby
produce inconsistent decisions. Id. at 709–10. The Ninth Circuit reversed, id. at 710, and the Supreme
Court affirmed on different grounds, id. at 711. The Court recognized that it had long held in its
abstention decisions that federal courts can dismiss cases where equitable relief is sought and
exceptional circumstances are present. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716–17. The Court also
acknowledged that over time it had expanded the power of the federal courts to decline to extend
their jurisdiction to all cases in which discretionary relief is sought and exceptional circumstances are
present. Id. at 718. The Court pointed out, however, that in prior abstention cases where damages
were sought, it had only permitted a federal court “to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of
the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether.” Id. at 719 (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–30 (1959)). The Court concluded that abstention-based remands or
dismissals of damages actions are an improper use of the federal courts’ discretionary power to decline
to exercise their jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 721. Because the case at bar was an
action for damages, “the District Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford
[abstention] doctrine.” Id. at 731.
91. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12. The Quackenbush Court also held that remand orders that
do not fall within § 1447(c) and (d) are appealable as final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at
712–15. Thus, Quackenbush disavowed the Thermtron Court’s statement that “‘an order remanding a
removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal’” and therefore can be
reviewed only through a writ of mandamus. Id. at 714–15 (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352–53 (1976)).
92. Id. at 718; see also id. at 717 (stating that “it has long been established that a federal court has
the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it is asked to employ its historic powers as a
court of equity” and concluding that “[t]his tradition . . . explains the development of our abstention
doctrines” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Federal courts abstain only in exceptional
circumstances. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. They do so “out of deference to the paramount interests
of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and federalism.” Id. at 723. For a
description of the relationship between courts’ jurisdictional duties to hear cases and abstention
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both Thermtron and Things Remembered, the Quackenbush Court reiterated
that § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) must be read together “‘so that only remands based
on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).’”93
Without additional explanation, the Court concluded that because abstentionbased remands are not remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect
in removal procedure, § 1447(d) is inapplicable to them.94
4.

Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.

In 2007, the Court decided Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.,95
doctrines, see generally Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certification from Abstention in
Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
847, 849–65 (2007).
93. 517 U.S. at 711–12 (quoting Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127).
94. Id. at 712. At the time Quackenbush was decided, the 1988 version of § 1447(c) was in effect.
Thus, the Quackenbush Court concluded that abstention-based remands are not based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure.
95. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007). In addition to Powerex, the Court also recently decided Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006) and Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007).
In Kircher, the district court remanded several cases to state court on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction over them under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”). 547
U.S. at 637–38. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision to remand
was substantive, not jurisdictional, and therefore § 1447(d) did not prohibit it from reviewing the
remand order. Id. at 638–39.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Id. at 648. It noted that it has “relentlessly repeated
that ‘any remand order issued on the grounds specified in § 1447(c) [is immunized from all forms of
appellate review], whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court.” Id. at
640 (alteration in original) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 351). Citing Things
Remembered, the Court further stated that “[t]he bar of § 1447(d) applies equally to cases removed
under the general removal statute, § 1441, and to those removed under other provisions, . . . and the
force of the bar is not subject to any statutory exception that might cover this case.” Id. at 641 (citation
omitted). The district court “said that it was remanding for lack of jurisdiction, an unreviewable
ground,” and “look[ing] beyond the court’s own label,” the remand orders were “unmistakably
premised” on the district court’s view that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Kircher, 547 U.S. at
641. Thus, the Court concluded that the remand orders were issued pursuant to § 1447(c) and
therefore were immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). Id.
In Osborn, the Court addressed the interaction of § 1447(c) and (d) with the Westfall Act. The
Westfall Act “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out
of . . . their official duties.” 549 U.S. at 229 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). “When a federal employee
is sued for wrongful or negligent conduct, the [Westfall] Act empowers the Attorney General to
certify that the employee ‘was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the
incident out of which the claim arose.’” Id. at 229–30 (quoting § 2679(d)(1), (2)). Once the certification
occurs, “the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employee,” and “[t]he litigation is
thereafter governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 230. If the action is filed in state court, the
Westfall Act provides that it is to be removed to federal court and renders the Attorney General’s
certification “‘conclusiv[e] . . . for purposes of removal.’” Id. (quoting § 2679(d)(2)).
In Osborn, “the United States Attorney, serving as the Attorney General’s delegate, certified
that [the defendant] was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the conduct alleged”
in the plaintiff’s complaint and removed the case to a federal district court.” Id. at 230–31. The district
court rejected the Westfall Act certification, “denied the Government’s motion to substitute the
United States as [a] defendant,” and remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Osborn,
549 U.S. at 231.
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another § 1447(d) case. In Powerex, four third-party defendants removed the
case.96 Powerex and a corporation owned by British Columbia removed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which permits a “foreign state,” as defined by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), to remove.97 The other two third-party
defendants were United States agencies;98 they removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a), which authorizes removal by federal agencies.99
The district court determined that sections 1441(d) and 1442(a) permit a
defendant to remove the entire case and therefore concluded that the removal
was proper.100 Ultimately, however, the district court remanded all of the claims

One question on appeal was whether the district court had authority under the Westfall Act to
remand the case. See id. (examining scope of appellate review permitted under Westfall Act). The
Supreme Court held that “once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to
adjudicate the case resides in the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the state
court.” Id. at 231.
A second question on appeal was whether § 1447(d) barred appellate review of the remand order
in the case at bar even though it was improper. See id. at 231–32 (addressing whether appellate review
of remand order was barred under § 1447(d)). The Court concluded that § 1447(d) was inapplicable
and that the remand order was reviewable. See id. (holding § 1447(d) “does not displace §
2679(d)(2)”). The Court reasoned that in this case, “§ 1447(c) and (d) must be read together with the
later enacted § 2679(d)(2). Both § 1447(d) and § 2679(d)(2) are antishuttling provisions. Each aims to
prevent ‘prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is
removed.’” Osborn, 549 U.S. at 243 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)).
According to the Court, only one “of the two antishuttling commands” could prevail, and it held that
“§ 2679(d)(2) controls.” Id. at 244. The Court insisted that its decision “scarcely mean[t] that whenever
the district court misconstrues a jurisdictional statute, appellate review of the remand is in order.” Id.
The Court acknowledged that “[s]uch an exception would . . . collide head on with § 1447(d), and with
[its] precedent.” Id. (citing Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127–28). Thus, the Court emphasized
that “[o]nly in the extraordinary case in which Congress has ordered the intercourt shuttle to travel
just one way—from state to federal court—does [its] decision hold sway.” Id.
96. 127 S. Ct. at 2414. The Powerex Court actually referred to the third-party defendants as
“cross-defendants.” Id. In the parlance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, however, they were
third-party defendants because the original defendants joined them to the action in order to seek
indemnification. See id. (noting that Powerex was joined by defendant “seeking indemnity”); FED. R.
CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a
nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(2)
(referring to “[t]he person served with the summons and third-party complaint” as “the ‘third-party
defendant’”). The Powerex Court presumably referred to the third-party defendants as crossdefendants because the case was originally filed in a California state court, Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct.
at 2414, the third-party defendants were joined to the action in state court, id., and the California
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an original defendant can join a party to the action by filing a
“cross-complaint” against the nonparty, see CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 428.10(b) (West 2008) (“A party
against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint . . . may file a cross-complaint setting
forth . . . [a]ny cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such
person is already a party to the action . . . .”); Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims,
and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–35
(1970) (discussing California state rules regarding mandatory and permissive cross-complaints against
third parties).
97. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2414.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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because it found that (1) Powerex did not qualify as a “foreign state” under the
FSIA; (2) the British Columbian corporation was immune from suit in federal
court under the FSIA; and (3) the federal agencies were immune from suit in
state court, and therefore a federal court could not acquire jurisdiction over
them upon removal.101 After concluding that § 1447(d) did not prohibit appellate
review of the remand order, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court but
concluded that it should have dismissed the claims against the federal agencies
instead of remanding them.102
Only Powerex appealed to the Supreme Court,103 and the Court held that it
did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the remand order.104 The Court first
rejected the argument that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if jurisdiction was absent at
the time of removal.105 Relying on the language of § 1447(c) and its history, the
Court concluded that when a case is properly removed but the district court
subsequently determines that it lacks jurisdiction, “the remand is covered by §
1447(c) and thus shielded from review by § 1447(d).”106 The Court reasoned that
“[n]othing in the text of § 1447(c) supports the proposition that a remand for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not covered so long as the case was properly
removed in the first instance.”107 Indeed, while the language of the 1948 version
of the statute provided for remand if the case “‘was removed improvidently and
108
without jurisdiction,’” the 1988 version and the current version require remand
“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.”109
Furthermore, the Court pointed out, the “same section of the public law
that amended § 1447(c) to include the phrase ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ also
created” the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).110 Section 1447(e) provides:
“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder
would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit
joinder and remand the action to State court.”111 According to the Court, §
1447(e) “unambiguously demonstrates that a case can be properly removed and
yet suffer from a failing in subject matter jurisdiction that requires remand.”112
Because the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” was inserted into § 1447(c) and

101. Id. at 2414–15.
102. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2415.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2417.
105. Id. at 2416.
106. Id. at 2417.
107. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2416.
108. Id. at 2415 (emphasis added) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336, 342 (1976)).
109. Id. at 2415–16 (emphasis added) (quoting Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
of 1988, Title X, § 1016(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006))).
110. Id. at 2417 (citing § 1016(c), 102 Stat. at 4670).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (emphasis added).
112. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417.
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(e) at the same time, under principles of statutory construction it should be
construed to have the same meaning in both subsections of the statute.113 Thus, if
removal is jurisdictionally proper but the district court later remands because
subject matter jurisdiction has been destroyed, appellate review of the remand
order is prohibited under § 1447(d).
The Powerex Court next addressed the question of whether the district
court had remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.114 The Court
first examined the remand order itself to determine how the district court had
characterized the remand.115 The Court concluded that the district court
purported to remand on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because (1) the heading of the remand order’s “discussion section” was “entitled
‘Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Removed Actions’”; (2) “the District
Court explicitly stated that the remand ‘issue hinge[d] . . . on the Court’s
jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims’”; and (3) in its order denying
a stay of the remand, the district court “repeatedly stated that a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to § 1447(c).”116
The Powerex Court then assumed without deciding “that § 1447(d) permits
appellate courts to look behind the district court’s characterization” of a remand
order as jurisdictional.117 The Court held, however, that “review of the District
Court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, to the extent it is permissible at all, should be limited to confirming
that that characterization was colorable.”118 After “looking behind” the district
court’s remand order, the Court concluded that the only “plausible” explanation
for the remand was that the district court believed it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims against Powerex once it decided that
Powerex was not a “foreign state” capable of independently removing the case
and that the other defendants were immune from suit.119
The Court acknowledged that it had never decided whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists over a removed claim when sovereign immunity bars the

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417. Writing for the majority in Powerex, Justice Scalia noted
that the question of whether § 1447(d) permits appellate courts to look behind the district court’s
characterization was reserved in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and that “[t]he Court’s opinion in
Osborn v. Haley . . . had nothing to say about the scope of review that is permissible under § 1447(d).”
Id. at 2417–18 & n.2. At least for Justices Scalia and Thomas, the district court’s characterization of the
remand order in Powerex as jurisdictional was enough to bring it within § 1447(d). Id. (citing Osborn v.
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 264 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)). However, “because
(presumably) [Justice Scalia] could not convince a majority of the Justices to join him on this point” in
Powerex, “he looked behind the district court’s characterization” of the remand order. Posting of Scott
Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/06/
powerex_corp_v_.html (June 18, 2007).
118. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418.
119. Id. at 2417–18.
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claims against the only parties capable of removing.120 Because the point was
“debatable,” however, the district court’s characterization of the remand as
subject matter jurisdictional was colorable and the Court concluded that the
remand was immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).121 The Court
reasoned that “[l]engthy appellate disputes about whether an arguable
jurisdictional ground invoked by the district court was properly such would
frustrate the purpose of § 1447(d).”122
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the remand order
was based on the district court’s discretionary decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and therefore was reviewable on appeal.123 The Court
again looked at the remand order and again concluded that the district court
“relied upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” as the basis for remand.124
According to the Powerex Court, the district court “never mentioned the
possibility of supplemental jurisdiction . . . in its original decision . . . []or in its
order denying [Powerex’s] motion to stay the remand pending appeal.”125 In
addition, it did not appear that the defendant had ever made any argument to
the district court “that supplemental jurisdiction was a basis for retaining the
claims against it.”126 Thus, there was “no reason to believe that an unmentioned
nonexercise of Cohill discretion was the basis for the remand.”127
In reaching this conclusion, the Court assumed that supplemental
jurisdiction was available in the circumstances of the case and that Cohill
remands are reviewable on appeal.128 Of crucial importance here, however, the
Court stated: “It is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental
jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”129 Echoing Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Things Remembered, the Court further emphasized
that it has “never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter
jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”130

120. Id. at 2418.
121. Id. In the Powerex case itself, it appears that removal was “proper” (or at least the Court
assumed it was) in that it satisfied the statutory requirements of §§ 1441(d) and 1442(a). Jurisdiction,
however, was lacking (based on the district court’s analysis) even at the time of removal. There was no
postremoval event that destroyed subject matter jurisdiction because it never existed in the first place.
Thus, it is not clear that the Powerex Court needed to reach the question of whether, when removal is
jurisdictionally proper, a postremoval event that gives rise to a defect in jurisdiction can result in a
remand that is immune from appellate review.
122. Id.
123. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418–19.
124. Id. at 2419.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418–19 (assuming decline of supplemental jurisdiction
precludes remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2419 n.4 (citing Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129–30 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 355 n.11 (1988)). Before
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Appellate Courts and Remand of Supplemental Claims
1.

Pre-Powerex Decisions

Prior to Powerex, the courts of appeals relied on Thermtron and Cohill to
uniformly conclude that Cohill remands are not made pursuant to § 1447(c) and
therefore § 1447(d) is inapplicable to them.131 More specifically, these courts

concluding its opinion, the Court rejected two additional arguments made by the defendant as to why
the remand order was reviewable. First, the defendant contended that “§ 1447(d) does not preclude
review of a district court’s merits determinations that precede . . . remand.” Id. at 2419. The Court
recognized that it held in Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934) that
orders which precede remand are reviewable on appeal. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2419. In the case
at bar, however, there was no district court order “separate from the remand” and therefore Waco did
not permit appellate review. Id. Second, the defendant argued that § 1447(d) was inapplicable because
the case was removed under the FSIA and “Congress could not have intended to grant district judges
irrevocable authority to decide questions with such sensitive foreign-relations implications.” Id. at
2419–20. The Court rejected this argument because Congress has not authorized appellate review of
FSIA remands, and the Court would not “ignore [§ 1447(d)] in reliance upon supposition of what
Congress really wanted.” Id. at 2420. Moreover, the defendant’s “divination of congressional intent
[was] flatly refuted by longstanding precedent.” Id. at 2420 (citing Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S.
at 128; United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946)).
131. For examples of various circuit courts applying the principle that § 1447(d) only bars
appellate review where the remand was based on § 1447(c), see Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524
F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2008); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Warrantech Corp., 461 F.3d 568, 571–
72 (5th Cir. 2006); Connolly v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., Inc., 427 F.3d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 2005); Ali v.
Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 812–13 (8th Cir. 2005); DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 396–402
(6th Cir. 2005); Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 653–57 (7th Cir. 2004); Bryan v. Bellsouth Commc’ns,
Inc., 377 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2004); Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 830–34 (7th Cir.
2003); Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 598–99 (8th Cir. 2002); First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v.
Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2002); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 594–95 (8th Cir.
2002); Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 614–15 (4th Cir. 2001); Long v. Bando Mfg.,
Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 2000); Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir.
1999); Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1998); Hudson
United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 155, 157–58 (3d Cir. 1998); St. John v. Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d 1214, 1216–17 (8th Cir. 1998); First Union Nat’l
Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 (11th Cir. 1997); Pa. Nurses Ass’n v. Pa. State Educ.
Ass’n, 90 F.3d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1996); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 541–42
(8th Cir. 1996); Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1450–53 (4th Cir. 1996); Trans Penn
Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 221–25 (3d Cir. 1995); Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 615–
16 (5th Cir. 1994); Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1994); Bogle v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1994); Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1994); Burks v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 987
F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union,
983 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 1993); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1479–80 (10th Cir. 1993);
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1539 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Surinam Airways Holding Co.,
974 F.2d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir.
1992); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1990); Hansen v. Blue
Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1989); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d
1101, 1106 n.4 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988);
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concluded that where a federal claim is eliminated from a removed case and a
district court remands any remaining state law claims, the remand order is
reviewable.132
Many of these courts reasoned that § 1447(c) authorizes the remand of only
those cases in which removal is improper (1) due to a defect in removal
procedure or (2) because jurisdiction is lacking at the time of removal.
According to these courts, Cohill remands are not based on § 1447(c) because in
those cases there is no question that jurisdiction exists at the time of removal: the
federal claim provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction in
federal court and either pendent jurisdiction or § 1367(a)—depending on when
the case was decided—provides supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. Thus, unless there is a defect in removal procedure,133 the removal is
Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1987); Scott v. Machinists Auto. Trades Dist. Lodge No.
190, 827 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Romulus Cmty. Schs., 729 F.2d 431, 434–35 (6th Cir. 1984).
132. When appellate courts reviewed Cohill remands prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), they did so by mandamus rather than
appeal. See supra note 68 for an example of the Supreme Court finding that a writ of mandamus, not
appeal, was the appropriate remedy. After the Quackenbush Court held that non-§ 1447(c) remands
are appealable as final judgments, appellate courts reviewed Cohill remands by appeal. See supra
notes 90–92 for an additional discussion of the Quackenbush holding.
133. There does not appear to be any question that Cohill remands are not based on a defect in
removal procedure. Under the 1948 version of § 1447(c), courts generally interpreted the phrase
“improvident removal” to mean that district courts could remand for “errors in the removal process.”
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Steinman, supra note 45, at
961–62 (citing various cases and noting that Cohill Court did not “utilize the language of
improvidence” but instead “found . . . that the case had been properly removed, and had remained
properly removed”). Thus, in addition to holding that Cohill remands were not based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, lower courts consistently held that such remands were not based on
improvident removal and therefore § 1447(d) was inapplicable to them. See Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1255
& n.10 (citing multiple cases); Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (stating that there was “no justification
for concluding that [the 1948 version of] section 1447(c) authorize[d] the remand of pendent claims on
the theory that they were removed ‘without jurisdiction’”).
When § 1447(c) was amended in 1988, the legislative history specifically stated that the
amendment was “written in terms of a defect in ‘removal procedure’ in order to avoid any implication
that remand is unavailable after disposition of all federal questions leaves only State law questions that
might be decided as a matter of . . . pendent jurisdiction or that instead might be remanded.” H.R.
REP. NO. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033; see also Snapper, 171 F.3d
at 1256 n.13 (stating that change in language from “removed improvidently” to “any defect in removal
procedure” is “best understood as a congressional ratification of . . . consistent judicial practice in
order to preclude any misapplication of the new [thirty-day] time limit” on filing remand motions
based on defect in removal procedure); Siegel, supra note 43 (stating that “dropping out” of claim on
which original jurisdiction is based is not defect in removal procedure “that would trigger the 30-day
rule”). In keeping with the legislative history, after the 1988 amendment lower courts continued to
conclude that Cohill remands were not based on a defect in removal procedure and therefore §
1447(d) was inapplicable to them on that ground. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1256–57 & n.17; see also id. at
1257 (stating that with regard to Cohill remands, this result made sense because it is unlikely that
Cohill remand order would be “ripe” within thirty days of removal).
When § 1447(c) was again amended in 1996, a question arose as to how expansively the phrase
“any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” should be interpreted. Specifically, lower
courts began to address whether “any defect” referred only to defects in removal procedure or if,
instead, it meant that motions to remand on any ground other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction
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proper and any remand of state law claims is not pursuant to § 1447(c). Instead,
the district court’s power to remand derives from either the doctrine of pendent
or supplemental jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohill.
Accordingly, these courts concluded that § 1447(d) is inapplicable to Cohill
remands.134
were now covered by § 1447(c)’s thirty-day time limit and therefore immune from appellate review
under § 1447(d). E.g., Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico v. Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 16–
17 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that § 1447(d) does not bar review of remand based on forum selection
clause); Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1252–60 (same); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157 (finding that §
1447(d) does not bar review of remand order because it was issued under § 1367(c), not § 1447(c)); see
also David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section 1447(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (2006)
(stating that the “other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” language is “like a residuary clause”
and could include Cohill remands within its reach).
Ultimately, the lower courts have concluded that the 1996 amendment applies to defects in
removal procedure only, and therefore it did not make remands on any ground—including Cohill
remands—subject to the thirty-day limit or expand the types of remands covered by § 1447(c) and (d).
See, e.g., Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, 201 F.3d at 16–17 (concluding that § 1447(d)
does not bar review of remand order based on forum selection clause because order was not issued
pursuant to § 1447(c)); Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1252–60 (same); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157–58
(concluding that § 1447(d) did not bar review of order remanding supplemental state claims after
federal claims had been dismissed because order was not issued pursuant to § 1447(c)); see also
Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 156 n.8 (stating that rather than understanding the 1996 amendment
“as a wholesale rejection of Thermtron and a dramatic expansion of § 1447(d),” court would “assume
that Congress did not mean to upset the Thermtron limits on § 1447(d), and that they remain in effect
unchanged by the intervening textual modifications to § 1447(c)”). Moreover, the Powerex Court
stated that it would assume that the 1996 amendment “was immaterial to Thermtron’s gloss on §
1447(d), so that the prohibition on appellate review remains limited to remands based on [lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and defects in removal procedure].” Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2416.
134. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank, 301 F.3d at 460 (finding that district court’s remand order was
reviewable because district court could not have concluded that it had supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims and declined to exercise that jurisdiction “had it determined that it never had subjectmatter jurisdiction over the removed case”); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157–58 (distinguishing §
1447(c) and Cohill remands on ground that “§1447(c) remands are warranted only when a federal
court has no rightful authority to adjudicate a state case that has been removed from state court,”
whereas Cohill remands “may be entered only when federal subject matter jurisdiction has been
affirmatively established, via [§1367(a)] and . . . . [therefore] does not imply that the case was
improperly filed in federal court”); Trans Penn Wax Corp., 50 F.3d at 223 (“[A] remand only falls
under § 1447(c) if the removal itself was jurisdictionally improper, not if the defect arose after
removal.”); Bogle, 24 F.3d at 761–62 (stating that “critical distinction” between nonreviewable §
1447(c) remand and reviewable [Cohill] remand is that “[i]n a Section 1447(c) remand, federal
jurisdiction never existed, and in a non-Section 1447(c) remand, federal jurisdiction did exist at some
point in the litigation, but the federal claims were either settled or dismissed”); Executive Software N.
Am., Inc., 24 F.3d at 1549 (stating that discretionary remand of supplemental claims is not done
pursuant to §1447(c) because in supplemental claim cases district court has asserted original
jurisdiction over at least one claim); Sever, 978 F.2d at 1539 (finding that remand of state claims was
reviewable because original removal was proper); cf. DaWalt, 397 F.3d at 400–02 (recognizing that §
1447(c) “on its face prohibits appellate review of subject-matter-jurisdiction remands that the district
judge makes ‘at any time,’” including those based on postremoval events, but concluding that
discretionary remands of pendent state law claims are exception to § 1447(c) and (d)); Adkins, 326
F.3d at 832–34 (stating that “any remand based on a conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking at the
time of removal is covered by § 1447(c) [and (d)], no matter when that fact becomes apparent,” but
further stating that if remand is based on “discretionary exercise of the power to decline supplemental
jurisdiction,” then remand is reviewable on appeal).
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Moreover, some courts further reason that the district court does not lose
jurisdiction over the state law claims postremoval. They note that it is undisputed
that a federal court has the power to adjudicate the supplemental claims even
after the federal claim has been eliminated or, alternatively, the district court can
remand the state law claims. Because the decision whether to hear or remand the
state law claims is discretionary, these courts conclude that the remand is not for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) therefore is
inapplicable.135
2. Post-Powerex: HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial
Co.
In HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,136 the Federal
Circuit became the first appellate court to hold that Cohill remands fall within §
1447(c) and thus are immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).137

135. See, e.g., Lindsey, 306 F.3d at 599 (stating that Cohill remand is not remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because district court “is not required to remand state law claims when the
only federal claim has been dismissed,” but instead “maintains discretion to either remand the state
law claims or keep them in federal court”); Long, 201 F.3d at 758 (“Here, the district court did not
remand because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; on the contrary, the district court explicitly stated
that it had subject matter jurisdiction when the case was removed and noted that it had not been
divested of that jurisdiction by the dismissal of the plaintiff’s federal claims.”); First Union Nat’l Bank,
123 F.3d at 1377–78 (finding that remand order was reviewable because district court never stated that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, “believed it had supplemental jurisdiction to hear the [state law
claim] under section 1367,” and based its remand order on its decision not to exercise its discretion to
hear supplemental claim); Gaming Corp., 88 F.3d at 542 (“Because the district court never lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and remanded under § 1367, neither § 1447(d) nor any other statutory bar
exists to [appellate review of the remand order].”); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied
Workers Int’l Union, 983 F.2d at 727 (finding that order remanding state law claims after federal claims
had been dismissed was reviewable because remand was “discretionary” and “did not stem from lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims”); In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974
F.2d at 1257 (concluding that Cohill remand is reviewable on appeal because it is not “premised on
either a defect in removal procedure or a lack of jurisdiction” under § 1447(c), but instead “is a
discretionary decision declining the exercise of expressly acknowledged jurisdiction”); Baker, Watts &
Co., 876 F.2d at 1106 n.4 (stating that because “[t]he district court did not believe that plaintiff’s
common law claims were improvidently removed and clearly recognized that it had the jurisdictional
power to resolve them on the merits even after dismissal of the federal claims,” discretionary decision
to remand them was “not jurisdictional” and therefore was reviewable on appeal); Price, 829 F.2d at
874 (finding that remand order was reviewable because removal was proper and district court’s
decision to remand remaining state claims was discretionary rather than mandatory); Scott, 827 F.2d at
592 (finding that remand order was reviewable because state law claims were within district court’s
supplemental jurisdiction, district court retained power to hear them after federal claims were
dismissed, and district court remanded them in its discretion, not because removal itself was
improper).
136. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
137. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. At least three circuits have already declined to follow HIF
Bio. Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 600–01 (5th Cir. 2009); Cal.
Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Bates v. Mo. &
N. Ark. R.R. Co., 548 F.3d 634, 636 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that district court's remand order was
reviewable on appeal because it was based on “refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” rather
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The District Court’s Remand Order

The plaintiffs in HIF Bio brought suit in a California state court, and the
defendants removed the case.138 After the defendants removed, the plaintiffs
filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) and asserted multiple claims.139
According to the district court, the plaintiffs first asserted two claims for
declaratory relief “with respect to ownership and inventorship” of an anticancer
agent.140 Second, the plaintiffs alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000).141 Third,
the plaintiffs asserted several state law claims: “slander, conversion, actual and
constructive fraud, intentional and negligent interference with contractual
relations and prospective economic advantage, breach of implied contract, unfair
competition and fraudulent business practices, unjust enrichment and
constructive trust.”142 Finally, the plaintiffs sought “a permanent injunction
restraining the Defendants from representing themselves as the inventors” of the
anticancer agent.143
One of the defendants, Carlsbad Technology, Inc. (“CTI”), then filed a
motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim.144 The district court issued an order granting the motion to
dismiss and remanding the case. Part B of the order’s “Discussion Section” was
labeled “Analysis,” and subsection 1 of Part B was entitled “State Claims.”145 In
that subsection, the district court stated in toto:
As a preliminary matter, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the FAC. The FAC
contains twelve causes of action, eleven of which are state claims. The
state claims clearly predominate over the federal RICO claim. The
preponderance of state law issues means that a state court is the proper
venue to try the state law claims.146
Subsection 2 of the district court’s “Analysis” was labeled “Declaratory
Judgment Claims.”147 In that subsection, the district court examined “the
Plaintiffs’ first two claims for declaratory judgment to determine whether they
[were] within the Court’s jurisdiction.”148 The district court rejected CTI’s
argument “that these two causes of action should be considered federal because
than “determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,” but citing HIF Bio as contrary
authority).
138. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 661.
139. Id. at 661–62.
140. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., No. CV 05-07976 DDP, 2006 WL 6086295, at
*1, *2, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006).
141. Id. at *2.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *4.
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they arise from the Patent Act, an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.”149
Instead, the court concluded that the declaratory judgment claims were “valid
state law claims” and that it “[did] not have jurisdiction over” them.150 The
district court then stated that it was remanding the declaratory judgment claims
“along with the other state law claims.”151
In subsection 3 of the remand order’s analysis section, the district court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a RICO claim.152 In its
conclusion, the district court dismissed the RICO claim and again stated that it
was remanding the state claims.153
b.

The Federal Circuit’s Opinion

CTI appealed, and the Federal Circuit concluded that § 1447(d) prohibited
it from exercising appellate jurisdiction to review the remand order.154 In
describing the district court’s order, the Federal Circuit stated that the lower
court “remanded all of the non-RICO causes of action . . . based on declining
supplemental jurisdiction.”155 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district
court held that it did not have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claims.156 The appellate court reasoned,
however, that “the district court did have federal question jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ alleged RICO claim.”157 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
“RICO claim was the basis for the district court’s § 1367(a) supplemental
jurisdiction over the inventorship and ownership claims, as well as the remaining
nine state claims,” and § 1367(c) was the basis on which the district court
remanded all of the state claims.158
The Federal Circuit then proceeded to analyze whether Cohill remands are
subject matter jurisdictional and therefore immune from appellate review. The
court first recognized that many other appellate courts have held that these types
of remands are reviewable on appeal.159 Nevertheless, the court interpreted
Powerex “to reopen the question of whether § 1367(c) remands are barred from
review under §§ 1447(c) and (d).”160 Relying on Powerex, the court held that
because a Cohill remand “can be colorably characterized as a remand based on

149. Id.
150. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *4.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *4–*5.
153. Id. at *6.
154. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
155. Id. at 664.
156. See id. (stating that district court found it lacked jurisdiction over state “inventorship and
ownership” claims).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 665.
160. Id. at 666.
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under § 1447(c), it is “barred from appellate
review by § 1447(d).”161
The court reasoned that supplemental state law claims by definition lack an
independent basis of jurisdiction and therefore a court has power over them only
if they fall within § 1367(a).162 According to the Federal Circuit, however, “[t]he
text of § 1367(a) indicates [that] § 1367(c) constitutes an express statutory
exception to the authorization of jurisdiction granted by § 1367(a).”163 Thus,
“when declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, a district court strips
the claims of the only basis on which they are within the jurisdiction of the
court.”164 Absent the “cloak of supplemental jurisdiction, [the] state claims must
be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”165
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the argument that Cohill
remands are similar to abstention-based remands and therefore, like abstentionbased remands, are subject to appellate review.166 The Federal Circuit
recognized that courts abstain and decline supplemental jurisdiction for similar
reasons and that both abstention and supplemental jurisdiction “are
discretionary doctrines that allow a district court to decline jurisdiction.”167
The court believed, however, that there is a “fundamental difference”
between abstention-based remands and Cohill remands, which “compels a
different result when applying the jurisdictional bar of § 1447(d).”168 It explained
that when a court abstains, it declines to hear “claims over which it has an
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, whether it be federal question
. . . or diversity jurisdiction.”169 Thus, “a remand premised on abstention cannot
be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of jurisdiction.”170
According to the Federal Circuit, Cohill remands are distinguishable because the
only basis for jurisdiction over supplemental claims is § 1367(a).171 And because
the court believed that § 1367(c) is an exception to § 1367(a), it reasoned that
once a court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction the state law claims
no longer fall within § 1367(a) and therefore are without any jurisdictional
basis.172 At that point, the Federal Circuit concluded, the district court must
remand the state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and § 1447(c) and
(d) bar appellate review of the remand order.173
161. Id. at 667.
162. See id. (noting that unless courts grant supplemental jurisdiction, state claims must be
remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
163. Id. (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
164. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 666–67.
167. Id. at 666.
168. Id. at 666–67.
169. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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III. COHILL REMANDS AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
This Part contends that the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal
Circuit’s decision in HIF Bio v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.174 that
Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under §
1447(c)—or at least can be colorably characterized as such—and therefore are
immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). Part III.A examines the
Powerex Court’s conclusion that postremoval events can result in remands for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and how this conclusion relates to Cohill
remands and HIF Bio.
Part III.B argues that the Federal Circuit’s analysis in HIF Bio is flawed for
two reasons. First, the court incorrectly concluded that Cohill remands are
subject matter jurisdictional because it confused the existence of judicial power
with the discretionary decision whether to exercise that power. Second, the court
failed to apply the Powerex test properly to determine whether the district
court’s characterization of the remand order in HIF Bio was jurisdictional and, if
so, whether that characterization was colorable. Part III.B concludes that the
Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit’s holding that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because the district court
did not characterize its remand as subject matter jurisdictional. Part III.B further
concludes that the Supreme Court should hold that Cohill remands are not
subject matter jurisdictional and any characterization of them as such is not
colorable.
Part III.C asserts that even if the Supreme Court ultimately determines that
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional, they do not fall within § 1447(c)
because § 1447(c) is applicable only where a court determines that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a “case” and remands the entire case. Finally,
Part III.D argues that in reaching a decision in HIF Bio, the Supreme Court
should take into account the consequences of any conclusion that Cohill remands
are covered by § 1447(c) and (d)—consequences that the Federal Circuit failed
to consider.
A.

Postremoval Events

The 1948 version of § 1447(c), which until 1949 was codified at subsection
(e), provided for remand where a case was “removed improvidently and without
jurisdiction.”175 In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,176 a case decided under
the 1948 statute, the Court held that where a pendent claim case is properly
removed and the federal claim is eliminated postremoval, a district court can

174. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (Supp. III 1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006)). See
supra note 49 for a description of the 1948 and 1949 revisions of the Judicial Code.
176. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
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remand the pendent claims instead of dismissing them.177 The Court said that the
authority to remand did not derive from § 1447(c)—i.e., the case had not been
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction—or any other part of “the
removal statute.”178
Instead, the power to remand “derive[d] from the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction”179 and the courts’ inherent authority “to deal with cases involving
pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine.”180 The Cohill Court thus concluded that the “remand authority
conferred by the removal statute and the remand authority conferred by the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at all.”181 Relying on Cohill,
appellate courts reasoned that pendent claim remands were not subject to the
review bar of § 1447(d) as long as removal was jurisdictionally proper.182 Even if
a postremoval event deprived the court of jurisdiction, that event did not bring
the case within § 1447(c) and (d).
The current version of § 1447(c) states (and the 1988 version stated) in
pertinent part: “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”183 Although
the “general rule” is “that postremoval events do not deprive federal courts of
subject-matter jurisdiction,”184 the Powerex Court nevertheless concluded that
when removal is jurisdictionally proper but a postremoval event gives rise to a
jurisdictional defect, “remand is authorized by § 1447(c) and appellate review is
barred by § 1447(d).”185 As the Powerex Court explained, both the language of §
1447(c) and its history support this reasoning.186 Furthermore, § 1447(e)—which
177. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 354–55 (reasoning that although removal statute does not address it,
other evidence suggests Congress would have authorized remand).
178. See id. at 355 n.11 (explaining authorization for remand under pendent jurisdiction is
entirely independent of that under sections 1441(c) and 1447(c)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 357. As the Cohill majority noted, id. at 355 n.11, even the three dissenting justices
recognized that the authority for the remand of the pendent claims did not come from § 1447(c): “The
Court today discovers an inherent power in the federal judiciary to remand properly removed cases to
state court . . . . Because I continue to believe that cases may be remanded only for reasons authorized
by statute . . . I dissent.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 358 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at
364 (“[B]ecause I believe that any authority to remand properly removed pendent claims must come
from Congress, I respectfully dissent.”).
181. Id. at 355 n.11.
182. See supra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of interpretations of Cohill.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1988 version of the statute also contained
this language. For a comparison of the language in the 1948, 1988, and 1996 versions of § 1447(c), see
supra Part II.B.1.
184. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 n.1 (2007) (citing Wis.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998)); accord St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292–93 (1938) (noting that events occurring after removal do not invalidate district
court’s jurisdiction once it attaches); see also Steinman, supra note 43, at 886 (noting Court often has
supported preservation of federal jurisdiction once it has been acquired).
185. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 n.1.
186. See supra Part II.C.4 for additional discussion of the Powerex opinion.
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provides for remand of the case if the district court permits joinder of a
nondiverse defendant after removal—“unambiguously demonstrates that a case
can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subject matter
jurisdiction that requires remand.”187
Thus, under Powerex, appellate courts can no longer simply determine that
a case was properly removed and conclude on that basis that the remand of
supplemental claims is not a remand pursuant to § 1447(c). The HIF Bio court
acknowledged this in a footnote when it said: “[F]rom a temporal perspective at
least, § 1367(c) remands are now potentially within the class of remands
described in § 1447(c) and thus subject to the jurisdictional bar of § 1447(d).”188
The question remains, however, whether the remand of claims over which the
district court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is required due to
a jurisdictional defect. As the Court pointed out in Powerex, it has “never passed
on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post1988 versions of § 1447(c).”189 Part III.B argues that they are not and that the
Federal Circuit misapplied Powerex to the remand order in HIF Bio.
B.

Power Versus Discretion and the Remand Order in HIF Bio
1. Why Cohill Remands Are Not “Subject Matter Jurisdictional” Under §
1447(c)

Before Powerex, appellate courts reasoned that Cohill remands are not
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they are discretionary, not
mandatory.190 The HIF Bio court effectively rejected this reasoning by
concluding that the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction constitutes
a loss of judicial power and therefore requires remand for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.191 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the fact that
every Cohill “remand necessarily involves a predicate finding that the claims at
issue lack an independent basis of . . . jurisdiction.”192 In addition, the Federal
Circuit distinguished abstention from the choice not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction on the ground that a court abstains from hearing claims over which it

187. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 (emphasis omitted). See supra Part II.C.4 for a discussion
of this component of the Powerex holding.
188. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 666 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
189. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2419 n.4 (emphasis added).
190. See supra Part II.D.1 for an analysis of pre-Powerex decisions. Both prior to and after the
enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, scholars took the position that Cohill remands
were discretionary and not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note
43 (noting remand of second claim depending on dropped first claim is not result of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (“[A] remand ordered as a matter of discretion
not to exercise conceded judicial power is not a remand predicated on a lack of jurisdiction.”);
Steinman, supra note 41, at 318 (noting § 1447(c) is inapplicable when courts, in their discretion,
decline to exercise jurisdiction, because such action does not indicate that jurisdiction is lacking).
191. See supra Part II.D.2 for a discussion of the HIF Bio opinion.
192. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667.
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has an independent basis of jurisdiction, while a court by definition does not
have an independent basis of jurisdiction over the claims it declines to adjudicate
under § 1367(c).193 According to the HIF Bio court, this difference in the two
doctrines compels disparate treatment under § 1447(c) and (d).194
The HIF Bio court, of course, is correct that supplemental claims by
definition do not have an independent basis of jurisdiction—e.g., federal
question or diversity. Furthermore, assuming that the Federal Circuit is correct
that courts abstain only from deciding claims with an independent basis of
subject matter jurisdiction,195 the court has undoubtedly identified a real

193. See supra Part II.D.2 for further elaboration on the HIF Bio decision.
194. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667.
195. The exact nature of the relationship between abstention and § 1367(c) is unclear at best.
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV.
1409, 1421 & n.52 (1999) (noting relationship’s ambiguity and cataloging various positions taken by
courts and scholars). If anything, comments by scholars, lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court
have suggested that courts can abstain under § 1367(c). If this is true, then the HIF Bio court is
incorrect that federal courts abstain only from deciding claims over which they have an independent
basis of subject matter jurisdiction.
For example, in his commentary on the 1990 adoption of the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
Professor David D. Siegel stated that § 1367(c)(1) and (2) are “analogous” to Pullman and Burford
abstention, “if not overlapping or duplicative” bases for declining jurisdiction. David D. Siegel,
Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1367, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (2006) (noting changes to removal
statute); see also David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1,
1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 67 (1991) (recognizing redundancy between §
1367(c)(1) and (2) and abstention). Other scholars and some courts have taken a similar position. See
White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) (treating § 1367(c) question as
abstention issue); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-91-0032WBS/PAN, 1992 WL
361696, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1992) (“[I]f it is not appropriate to abstain it is likewise not
appropriate to decline the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.”); Patrick D.
Murphy, A Federal Practitioner’s Guide to Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78
MARQ. L. REV. 973, 1024–25, 1028 n.288 (1995) (stating that § 1367(c)(1) is analogous to Pullman
abstention, that declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) can be analogized to abstention
under Burford, and that § 1367(c)(4) bears resemblance to Colorado River abstention); John B.
Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 766–68 (1991) (noting § 1367(a) and
(c) incorporate abstention doctrine language and appear to limit discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1416 n.55 (2005) (noting resemblance between aims of § 1367(c)(1) and
Pullman abstention); Joan Steinman, Section 1367—Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85, 92
(1992) (stating that § 1367(c)(1) “is redolent of language used in abstention cases”).
In 1997, the Supreme Court suggested in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons that
some relationship does indeed exist between abstention doctrines and § 1367(c). 522 U.S. 156, 173–74
(1997). Specifically, the Court stated:
In addition to their discretion under § 1367(c), district courts may be obligated not to
decide state law claims (or to stay their adjudication) where one of the abstention doctrines
articulated by this Court applies. Those doctrines embody the general notion that “federal
courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise exceptional circumstances,
where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest
. . . .”
Id. at 174 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)).
After the Court’s decision in College of Surgeons, scholars began to argue that § 1367(c)(4)
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distinction between the two doctrines. This distinction, however, is immaterial.
Instead, the crucial distinction is the difference between the existence of judicial
power—i.e., subject matter jurisdiction—and the exercise of that power. The
existence of judicial power is a yes or no question. The decision whether to
exercise that power, on the other hand, is discretionary in both the abstention
and supplemental jurisdiction contexts once certain criteria are satisfied.196

codifies abstention principles. For example, in interpreting the Court’s statement in College of
Surgeons, Professor Oakley focused on the Court’s quotation of the “exceptional
circumstance”/“important countervailing interest” test for abstention and the similarity between this
test and a court’s discretion to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4) where “in exceptional
circumstances, there are . . . compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006);
THE AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 93 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
According to Professor Oakley, it appears that the “exceptional circumstances/compelling reasons”
standard of “present § 1367(c)(4) . . . would permit supplemental jurisdiction to be declined as to any
claim that absent such statutory discretion would be eligible for abstention under the virtually
indistinguishable ‘exceptional circumstances/important countervailing interest’ test for when
abstention is proper.” THE AM. LAW INST., supra, at 93. Other scholars and observers have made
arguments similar to Professor Oakley’s. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum
Selection and Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity Jurisdiction;
Removal; Preemption; Venue; Transfer of Venue; Persona [sic] Jurisdiction; Abstention and the All
Writs Act, SL081 ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials (2006) (stating that § 1367(c)(4) “would seem
to include the following abstention formulas: cases where state law claims may be unclear – Pullman;
cases involving state criminal proceedings – Younger; and, cases where the same parties are litigating
the same issues in state court – Colorado River”); see also SST Global Tech., LLC v. Chapman, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 465–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding supplemental jurisdiction proper where forum was not
inconvenient, abstention would not avoid piecemeal litigation, proceedings in federal forum would not
be duplicative, state proceeding progressed further than federal proceeding, and where state forum
provided sufficient protection for plaintiff’s interests); SST Global Tech., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 462–
63 (discussing Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1087 (1993)); Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow Directions: When District
Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 995, 1026–27, 1029 (1998) (acknowledging legal scholars have argued that § 1367(c)(4) codifies
Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention and contending that Colorado River also permits courts to
decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4)). But see U.S. Fin. Corp. v. Warfield, 839 F. Supp. 684, 691 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (explaining that court-formulated abstention doctrines do not trump statutory language of
§ 1367(c)(4) requiring compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction).
196. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (stating that subject matter
jurisdiction “poses a ‘whether,’ not a ‘where’ question: Has the Legislature empowered the court to
hear cases of a certain genre?”); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970). In Rosado, the
Supreme Court found that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims even after the
plaintiff’s federal claim became moot. 397 U.S. at 401–04. The Rosado Court “adhered to the position
that when a federal court has power to adjudicate a state claim, the decision whether to exercise that
jurisdiction is a matter of discretion.” Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (discussing Rosado, 397 U.S. at
403–05). Thus, the Court
distinguished between the existence of judicial power and the exercise of that power. The
first is a “yes or no” question as to whether jurisdiction exists; the second is merely a matter
of discretion. Where there is power, a decision not to hear the state claim is purely a
discretionary decision not to exercise that power. Hence, a remand ordered as a matter of
discretion not to exercise conceded judicial power is not a remand predicated on a lack of
jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004) (opinion of Easterbrook,
J.) (stating that it is important to “distinguish between a decision that ‘[a] court lacks adjudicatory
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Judicial Power

“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction” is a court’s “statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate [a] case.”197 It is axiomatic that a federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim only when both the U.S. Constitution and a federal
statute provide the court with power to adjudicate the claim. For example, a
claim falls within the federal question jurisdiction of a federal court only when
both Article III of the Constitution and § 1331 authorize the court to adjudicate
the claim. Similarly, a claim falls within the supplemental jurisdiction of a federal
court only when both Article III and § 1367(a) authorize adjudication.198 When a
civil action is filed in or removed to federal court, the constitutional and
statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction either are satisfied or they
are not, and judicial power either exists or it does not.
b.

The Discretionary Decision Whether to Exercise Judicial Power:
Abstention and Supplemental Jurisdiction

Generally, when the jurisdiction of a federal court is properly invoked, the
court has a “strict duty” to adjudicate the controversy.199 This “duty” derives
from the “undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the
Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally
permissible bounds.”200 Nevertheless, the federal courts’ obligation to decide
cases is not “absolute.”201 The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts
have the power to abstain in certain cases.202 Under the abstention doctrines,
competence’ and a decision that ‘[a] court has been authorized to do X and having done so should bow
out’” because “[t]he former implies lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . .; the latter implies the
presence of jurisdiction”), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (stating
that “a suit under federal law with a state-law claim supported by . . . supplemental jurisdiction” is
“good example” of category in which court has adjudicatory competence but is authorized to decline
to exercise its power and “having done so should bow out”); Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited:
When and How Federal Trial Court Remand Orders Are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 420–21
(1987) (arguing that it is inaccurate to describe pendent jurisdiction as discretionary and that it is
preferable to describe federal courts as having jurisdiction over claims which they may decline to
adjudicate).
197. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see also Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2007) (stating that “subject matter jurisdiction” is
the “power to adjudicate . . . claims”); Dodson, supra note 41, at 59 (defining jurisdiction as court’s
authority “to issue legitimate, binding, and enforceable orders”).
198. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). See supra note 41 for a discussion of requirements for falling within
the ambit of § 1367(a).
199. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (stating that federal courts have “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to
exercise the jurisdiction given them”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given.”).
200. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (citing
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
201. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716.
202. See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813–17 (discussing different categories of abstention and
citing many cases in which Supreme Court has approved of abstention).
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“federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise
exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest.”203 The Supreme Court has “located the
power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts sitting in
equity,” but it has also “recognized that the authority of a federal court to
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has
discretion to grant or deny relief.”204
Similarly, the decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction that
exists under § 1367(a) is discretionary once a court has determined that § 1367(c)
is satisfied. Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)
or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute,” the district courts “shall
205
have supplemental jurisdiction” when the statute is properly invoked. The
mandatory language in § 1367(a)—“shall have supplemental jurisdiction”—
indicates that the court has a duty to adjudicate the supplemental claims before
it. Section 1367(a) makes it clear, however, that the court’s duty is not
absolute.206 Subsection (b) provides that in diversity cases, the district courts
“shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)” over particular
claims. Thus, in certain cases subsection (b) specifically withdraws the
jurisdiction granted under subsection (a).207
In contrast, under subsection (c) a district court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)” if one of the criteria

203. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a federal court
abstains, it either: (1) declines to exercise its jurisdiction altogether by remanding a removed case to
state court or dismissing the case outright, or (2) “postpones” the exercise of its jurisdiction by staying
the federal proceedings and remitting the parties to a state court. See, e.g., id. at 731 (“[F]ederal courts
have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25, 30–31 (1959) (affirming district court’s stay of proceedings on abstention grounds); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–36 (1943) (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint on
abstention grounds).
204. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the
past, it has been unclear whether, for example, “Pullman abstention is mandatory or discretionary.”
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 795 (5th ed. 2007). In other words, it has been
uncertain whether a court is obligated to abstain if the requirements for abstention are satisfied or
whether a court can decide to exercise jurisdiction even if the requirements for abstention are
satisfied. According to Dean Chemerinsky, “[t]he preferable approach is to treat abstention as
discretionary and to allow federal courts to hear the case, even if the Pullman criteria are met,
provided substantial reasons for avoiding abstention are present.” Id. As noted above, the Court
stated in Quackenbush, its most recent abstention decision, that abstention is “derive[d] from the
discretion historically enjoyed by courts of equity.” 517 U.S. at 728; see also Burford, 319 U.S. at 317–
18 (describing court’s choice of whether to abstain as matter of discretion). Thus, the better conclusion
is that the decision whether to abstain is a discretionary one.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
206. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code
Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 938–39 (1998) (arguing that § 1367(a)’s language
granting liberal supplemental jurisdiction is meant to be limited only by exceptions enumerated in
other federal statutes or subsections (b) and (c) of § 1367).
207. See id. at 943 (distinguishing § 1367(b) from § 1367(c) by noting that § 1367(b) serves to
withdraw jurisdiction authorized by § 1367(a)).
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enumerated in subsection (c) is satisfied.208 Subsection (c), unlike subsection (b),
does not withdraw the jurisdiction granted in subsection (a).209 Instead,
subsection (c) authorizes a district court to decline to exercise the power that it
has under subsection (a) if subsection (c) is satisfied and the court chooses not to
exercise its power. The court may, but is not obligated to, decline to exercise its
supplemental power.210 Thus, contrary to the HIF Bio court’s conclusion, the
plain language of subsection (c) demonstrates that it is not an express statutory
exception to subsection (a). Instead, when a court declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), as when it abstains, the court is
making a discretionary decision not to exercise existing judicial power.211 The
court has both constitutional and statutory authority to adjudicate the claim but
chooses not to use its power.
Furthermore, jurisdiction does not evaporate at the moment a court
declines to exercise its supplemental power.212 Once a court has determined that

208. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (emphasis added). Section 1367(c) specifically provides that a court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issues of
State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims” within the court’s original
jurisdiction, “(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4)
in exceptional circumstances.” Id.
The circuits are divided regarding whether § 1367(c) codifies the broad discretionary approach
under Gibbs or is limited to only the criteria listed therein. Compare, e.g., Borough of W. Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that district court can decline to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) for reasons of convenience, fairness, judicial economy, and
comity, as set forth in Gibbs), with Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545,
1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that district court can decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
under § 1367(c) only for reasons listed in statute), overruled by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex
Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, a case
decided after Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Gibbs approach is the proper one when it stated: “[Section 1367] . . . reflects the
understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). See generally Rachel Ellen Hinkle, Comment, The Revision
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate over the District Court’s Discretion to Decline Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. REV. 111, 120–36 (2001) (discussing circuit split).
209. Oakley, supra note 204, at 943 (arguing that § 1367(c) “seeks . . . to resurrect the element of
judicial discretion in the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction that the mandatory phrasing of
subsection 1367(a) needlessly extinguished”).
210. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172 (“Of course, to say that the terms of § 1367(a)
authorize the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims . . . does not
mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.”).
211. See Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 6 F.3d 856, 860 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Because
abstention, by definition, assumes the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the abstaining court—
after all, one must have . . . subject matter jurisdiction in order to decline the exercise of it—section
1447(c) does not apply to an abstention-driven remand.”), rejected by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712–15 (1996); Siegel, supra note 132 (stating that decision whether to remand
supplemental claim after main claim has been disposed of on merits is, like abstention, discretionary).
212. This argument is derived from Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 849–50 (7th Cir.
2004) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 633 (2006). In Kircher, the
plaintiffs sued an investment fund and its adviser in state court for misconduct under state law. 373
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§ 1367(c) is applicable and that it will exercise its discretion not to adjudicate a
supplemental claim, there is nothing left for the court to do except remand or
dismiss the claim. The remand does not result from a lack of jurisdiction but
instead from the court’s decision not to exercise its existing judicial authority.
Accordingly, remands under § 1367(c), like abstention-based remands, are not
subject matter jurisdictional.
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that the decision whether to decline
to exercise pendent or supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. Prior to the
enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Gibbs Court said that
pendent jurisdiction “need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to
exist. It . . . is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”213 After Gibbs, the
Cohill Court held that a district court had the discretion to remand pendent
claims once the federal claim was eliminated, not that the court was required to

F.3d at 847. The defendants removed the suit under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998. Id. at 848.
The district court remanded the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that § 1447(c) and (d) did not insulate the remand order from appellate review because the
removal itself was jurisdictionally proper and no postremoval events “undercut the propriety of the
removal.” Id. at 851. Instead, according to the Seventh Circuit, the “only pertinent development”
postremoval was that the district court made a “substantive decision” under SLUSA that remand was
appropriate for nonjurisdictional reasons. Id. at 849, 851. The appellate court reasoned that once the
district court made its substantive decision, it “had nothing else to do: dismissal and remand [were] the
only options.” Kircher, 373 F.3d at 849–50.
The court recognized that it was possible to conclude “that jurisdiction evaporated at that
juncture,” but rejected this conclusion. Id. at 850. The court emphasized the distinction between the
decision that “‘[a] court lacks adjudicatory competence’ and a decision that ‘[a] court has been
authorized to do X and having done so should bow out.’” Id. In the latter situation, the court has “no
adjudicatory competence to do more,” but it “is not the ‘lack of subject-matter jurisdiction’ that
authorizes a remand. Otherwise every federal suit, having been decided on the merits, would be
dismissed ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ because the court’s job was finished.” Id.
According to the court, remands under § 1367(c) are a “good example” of the second category: a
court has adjudicatory competence under § 1367(a), but once it decides not to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (c), it should bow out. Id. The remand, however, is not for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction simply because the court’s job is finished. Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that once the district court in Kircher made the substantive
decision that remand was appropriate, its only options were remand and dismissal. Id. at 849–50. That
did not mean, however, that the remand was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction just because the
court had finished its work. Id. at 850.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court’s remand order was, in fact, based on
a lack of jurisdiction and therefore it was immune from appellate review under § 1447(c) and (d).
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642–44 (2006). The Court noted that the only
adjudicatory competence the district court had was the power to determine if it actually had
jurisdiction to proceed with the case. Id. at 644. Because the Court concluded that judicial power never
existed in Kircher, once the district court decided that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the remand
order necessarily fell within § 1447(c) and (d). Id. at 645–48. Although the Supreme Court overruled
the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the remand order was reviewable on appeal, the Court neither
called into question nor even addressed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that there is a distinction
between the existence of judicial power and the decision whether to exercise it. The Court simply did
not reach this issue because it concluded that judicial power never existed. Id. at 646–48.
213. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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do so because of a jurisdictional defect.214 And this discretion “enable[d] district
courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves
the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine.”215
Then, in International College of Surgeons, a case interpreting the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Court said that § 1367(c) “confirms the
discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the
circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.”216 The Court
quoted Gibbs for the proposition that “pendent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.’”217 The Court also acknowledged that
although “the terms of § 1367(a) authorize the district courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims,” that “does not mean that the
jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.”218 Finally, relying on Cohill, the
International College of Surgeons Court concluded that § 1367(c) “reflects the
understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,
‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”219
Thus, although the Court has never directly “passed on” whether Cohill remands
are subject matter jurisdictional, the Court has never suggested that the decision
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is anything other than
discretionary once § 1367(c) is satisfied.
c.

Application to HIF Bio220

In HIF Bio, the removal was jurisdictionally proper. Thus, judicial power
existed for the federal court to adjudicate the claims before it. In its remand
order, the district court decided that the two declaratory judgment claims were
state rather than federal claims.221 The district court also dismissed the federal
RICO claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.222 At
that point, there was no question that the district court retained jurisdiction to
decide the supplemental state law claims.223 The district court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under § 1367(c)(2),

214. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).
215. Id.
216. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 172 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 173 (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350).
220. See supra Part II.D.2 for a detailed explanation of the district court’s remand order and the
Federal Circuit’s opinion.
221. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
222. Id. at 662.
223. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970) (finding federal jurisdiction for
supplemental state law claims proper where federal claim was dismissed); see also Steinman, supra
note 45, at 963 (noting that federal courts retain jurisdiction to adjudicate supplemental state claims
even after dismissal of federal question claims).

1106

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

however, because they predominated over the federal claim and therefore
belonged in state court.224 Thus, the court decided in its discretion not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims and to remand them to state court.225
There was no lack of subject matter jurisdiction—i.e., judicial power—requiring
the court to remand. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under §
1367(c)(2)—a discretionary decision—given the circumstances of the case.
2.

Powerex and the Remand Order in HIF Bio

Under Powerex, an appellate court should determine if a remand order is
subject matter jurisdictional and therefore immune from appellate review by (1)
examining the remand order to determine how the district court characterized
the remand; and (2) if the district court characterized the remand as subject
matter jurisdictional, looking behind the remand order to determine if that
characterization is colorable.226 This section explains how the Federal Circuit
misapplied the Powerex test in HIF Bio and concludes that under Powerex, the
Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s Cohill
remand.
The first step under Powerex is to determine whether the district court in
HIF Bio characterized the remand as subject matter jurisdictional, which in turn
requires a careful examination of the remand order.227 This task is complicated
in HIF Bio, however, because the district court stated in subsection 1 of its
Analysis that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all
eleven state claims in the complaint, but then concluded in subsection 2 that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the two declaratory judgment claims.228
The court stated that it was remanding all of the claims, but it did not clarify
whether it was remanding the declaratory judgment claims because it lacked
jurisdiction over them or because it had declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over them.229
One way to reconcile these statements is to conclude that the plaintiffs
actually asserted thirteen state claims in the complaint.230 If that is the case, then

224. See supra Part II.D.2 for a discussion of the district court’s decision in HIF Bio. The district
court also could have declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) because the
federal claim had been eliminated.
225. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 664.
226. See supra Part II.C.4 for a discussion of the analysis used in Powerex.
227. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007).
228. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s
decision to decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and its conclusion that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claims.
229. See supra notes 146–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s
decision to remand all claims without clarification about whether the court lacked or simply declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claims.
230. The district court did not specifically count the state claims in the complaint. Instead, in the
first part of its remand order it said that the plaintiffs sought “declaratory judgment with respect to
ownership and inventorship” of the anticancer agent. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co.,
No. CV 05-07976, 2006 WL 6086295, at *2, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006). It also stated that the plaintiffs
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the district court remanded the two declaratory judgment claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, but remanded the eleven other state claims after
deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Another possibility
is that the plaintiffs asserted only eleven state claims in the complaint (including
the two for declaratory relief), and the district court remanded all of the claims
after deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of them. If that
is the case, then the district court must have concluded that, although the two
claims for declaratory relief did not have an independent basis of jurisdiction,
they were supplemental to the RICO claim under § 1367(a), just like the nine
other state claims, and it could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
them as well. There does not seem to be any doubt that the declaratory judgment
claims were supplemental to the RICO claim, but the district court never said so
explicitly or clearly stated that it was remanding them based on its decision not
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the latter interpretation of the district
court’s remand order was correct and characterized the district court as
“declining supplemental jurisdiction” over all of the state claims in HIF Bio.231
The court does not appear to have analyzed whether the district court actually
characterized the remand order as subject matter jurisdictional. Nevertheless,
the court “looked behind” the remand order to determine whether Cohill

had asserted a RICO claim and claims for “slander, conversion, actual and constructive fraud,
intentional and negligent interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage,
breach of implied contract, unfair competition and fraudulent business practices, unjust enrichment
and constructive trust.” Id. at *2. The district court then noted that the plaintiffs also sought a
permanent injunction. Id. In subsection 1 of its Analysis, the district court referred to the complaint as
containing “twelve causes of action, eleven of which are state claims.” Id. at *3.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the complaint contained eleven causes of action by counting
them as follows:
The first and second causes of action seek a declaratory judgment for ownership and
inventorship . . . . The third cause of action asserts violations of [RICO]. The remaining nine
causes of action are based respectively on slander of title; conversion; actual and constructive
fraud; intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic
advantage; negligent interference with contractual relations and prospective economic
advantage; breach of implied contract; unfair competition and fraudulent business practices;
unjust enrichment-constructive trust; and permanent injunction.
HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662 (citations omitted).
It is possible to conclude that there were thirteen claims or causes of action by counting them as
follows: (1) declaratory judgment for ownership, (2) declaratory judgment for inventorship, (3)
slander, (4) conversion, (5) actual fraud, (6) constructive fraud, (7) intentional interference with
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, (8) negligent interference with contractual
relations and prospective economic advantage, (9) breach of implied contract, (10) unfair competition
and fraudulent business practices, (11) unjust enrichment, (12) constructive trust, and (13) request for
permanent injunction. Id. Alternatively, the unfair competition and fraudulent business practices
“claim” could be counted as two separate claims and the request for a permanent injunction could be
viewed as a remedy and not a cause of action. Yet another possibility is that unfair competition and
fraudulent business practices can be counted as two claims, but unjust enrichment and constructive
trust should be counted as one claim and the request for a permanent injunction should also be
counted as a claim. Under any of these scenarios, the plaintiffs actually asserted thirteen claims.
231. 508 F.3d at 664.
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remands are based on a defect in subject matter jurisdiction or can be “colorably
characterized” as such and therefore fall within the class of remands barred from
appellate review.232 After the Federal Circuit concluded (incorrectly) that Cohill
remands fall within § 1447(c) and (d), it held that it lacked jurisdiction over
CTI’s appeal.233 As explained below, the Federal Circuit incorrectly applied the
Powerex test to the Cohill remand in HIF Bio and erred in concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the remand order.234
232. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HIF Bio court’s
process for determining the nature of the district court’s decision to remand the claims.
233. See supra notes 158–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s
holding.
234. This conclusion and the subsequent analysis assume that the district court in HIF Bio
remanded all of the state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c). The district court, however, did not clearly
state the basis for its remand of the declaratory judgment claims; it simply stated that it was remanding
them. Based on the district court’s statement in subsection 1 of its Analysis that it was declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “all” of the state claims, it seems most likely that the district
court remanded the declaratory judgment claims on that basis. If that is the case, then as explained
above the entire remand order in HIF Bio is reviewable on appeal.
It is possible to argue, however, that the district court remanded the declaratory judgment claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—or at least the remand order can be characterized in that way—
and therefore they are unreviewable on appeal. The resolution of this issue matters because the
defendant argued that the declaratory judgment claims arose under patent law and the federal court
therefore had exclusive jurisdiction over them. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *4. If the remand of
these claims is reviewable on appeal, then the Federal Circuit may agree with the defendant and
conclude that these claims belong in federal court. On the other hand, if the remand of these claims is
unreviewable, a state court will try them even if a federal court is the only court that is competent to
hear them.
Powerex does not address the circumstance where the basis for the remand is unclear. In
Powerex, there was no question that the district court was purporting to remand because it believed it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Powerex once it concluded that the other
third-party defendants were immune from suit. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct.
2411, 2414–15 (2007). The Court had never actually decided whether a remand in these circumstances
was required due to a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 2418. The point was “debatable,”
however, and thus the district court’s characterization of the remand as subject matter jurisdictional
was colorable. Id. In contrast, in HIF Bio it is unclear whether the district court was purporting to
remand the declaratory judgment claims under § 1367(c) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
There is no question, however, that the district court could have remanded the declaratory judgment
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction once it concluded that they did not arise under patent law.
In other words, if the district court characterized the remand of the declaratory judgment claims as
subject matter jurisdictional, then that characterization is certainly colorable.
Although Powerex itself does not resolve the question of whether the remand of the declaratory
judgment claims in HIF Bio is reviewable on appeal, the Powerex Court’s rationale may provide some
guidance. The Powerex Court reasoned that “[l]engthy appellate disputes about whether an arguable
jurisdictional ground invoked by the district court was properly such would frustrate the purpose of §
1447(d).” Id. Thus, the Court adopted the “colorably characterized” test because it believed that it
would limit litigation regarding appellate review of remand orders.
Applying the Powerex rationale to the remand of the declaratory judgment claims in HIF Bio
leads to the conclusion that because the district court arguably characterized the basis for its remand
of those claims as subject matter jurisdictional and because that basis is colorable, the remand of the
declaratory judgment claims should be immune from appellate review. This solution, in effect, would
amend the Powerex test to ask (1) whether the district court arguably characterized its remand as
subject matter jurisdictional; and (2) if so, whether that characterization is colorable. Under the
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The initial question under Powerex is whether the district court
characterized the remand as subject matter jurisdictional. In answering this
question, the Federal Circuit simply stated that the district court declined
supplemental jurisdiction over all of the state claims in HIF Bio.235 The court did
not carefully examine the remand order, as required under Powerex,236 to
determine if the district court actually characterized the remand as subject
matter jurisdictional.
First, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s contention, the district court did not
say that it was “declining supplemental jurisdiction” over the state claims.237
Instead, in subsection 1 of its Analysis, the district court specifically said that it
was “declin[ing] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the eleven state
claims in the complaint.238 Section 1367(c) provides that a district court “may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if § 1367(c) is satisfied. A court
cannot “decline supplemental jurisdiction” under § 1367(c) because the existence
of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a)—i.e., judicial power—is a yes or no
question.239 The decision whether to exercise that power, however, is
discretionary.240 The remand order in HIF Bio was based on the district court’s
discretionary decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because
the state law claims predominated over the federal claim.241 It was not based on
the decision to “decline jurisdiction,” a decision that the district court was
without power to make since the claims fell within its § 1367(a) jurisdiction.
Second, the remand order in Powerex stated that “the remand ‘issue
hinge[d] . . . on the Court’s jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims,’”
and the district court “repeatedly stated” in its order denying a stay of remand
that “a lack of subject matter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to §
1447(c).”242 In contrast, the remand order in HIF Bio did not indicate that the
district court was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it

Powerex rationale, this revised test should avoid lengthy appellate disputes about both whether the
district court characterized its remand order as subject matter jurisdictional and whether an arguable
jurisdictional ground is properly such. And under this revised test, the remand of the declaratory
judgment claims in HIF Bio is not subject to appellate review.
235. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662.
236. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417.
237. The HIF Bio court repeatedly and incorrectly used the phrase “declining supplemental
jurisdiction.” E.g., 508 F.3d at 664 (“In this case, the district court’s remand order is based on declining
supplemental jurisdiction.”); id. at 665 (“[W]e are faced with an issue of first impression for this court:
whether a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is within the class of
remands described in § 1447(c).”); id. at 667 (“[A] remand based on declining supplemental
jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
238. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *3 (emphasis added).
239. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the relation between subject matter jurisdiction
and supplemental claims.
240. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the discretionary nature of supplemental
jurisdiction.
241. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 664.
242. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2007).
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lacked power over the state law claims.243 Instead, the district court made it clear
that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the state
claims predominated over the federal RICO claim and therefore state court was
the proper forum in which to litigate them.244 Thus, the district court in HIF Bio
in no way characterized the Cohill remand as subject matter jurisdictional.
Under Powerex, because the district court did not characterize the Cohill
remand in HIF Bio as based on a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit should not have “looked behind” the remand order (step two of
245
the Powerex analysis) to determine whether Cohill remands are subject matter
jurisdictional. Instead, the Federal Circuit should have concluded that the
remand did not fall within § 1447(c) and that the review bar of § 1447(d)
therefore did not apply. At that point, the Federal Circuit should have turned to
the merits of the appeal.
If the district court in HIF Bio had actually characterized the remand of the
state claims under § 1367(c) as subject matter jurisdictional, then it would have
been appropriate for the Federal Circuit to proceed to the question of whether
such a characterization is colorable. In Powerex, it was debatable whether there
was actually a defect in subject matter jurisdiction that required remand, but that
was enough for the Court to conclude that the district court’s characterization of
its remand as subject matter jurisdictional was colorable. In contrast, if a district
court were to characterize or attempt to characterize a Cohill remand as based
on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the characterization would not be
colorable because, although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional, the issue is not debatable.
As explained in Part III.B.1 above, both the language of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute and Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that the decision
whether to exercise supplemental power that exists under § 1367(a) is
discretionary once § 1367(c) is satisfied. And if a court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and remands the claims, the remand is based on the
court’s use of its discretion, not a jurisdictional defect. Jurisdiction does not
evaporate at the moment a court decides not exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and
hold that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the Cohill remand in HIF
Bio. More broadly, the Court should hold that any characterization of Cohill
remands as subject matter jurisdictional under § 1447(c) is not colorable, and
therefore such remands are reviewable on appeal under the Court’s current
interpretation of § 1447(c) and (d).
243. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662.
244. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., No. CV 05-07976, 2006 WL 6086295, at *3
(C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006). The district court did not actually cite § 1367(c) as the basis for its decision
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; however, § 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the state law claims “substantially predominate[] over the
claim or claims over which the district court has [an independent basis of jurisdiction].” 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (c)(2) (2006). Thus, § 1367(c)(2) obviously was the basis for the district court’s decision not to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
245. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417.
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The Remand of Claims and Cases Under § 1447(c)

After concluding that Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the HIF Bio court automatically assumed that they therefore fall
“within the class of remands described in § 1447(c), and thus barred from
appellate review by § 1447(d).”246 Even if the Supreme Court ultimately
concludes that Cohill remands can be colorably characterized as remands for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, they will not necessarily fall within §
1447(c). Section 1447(c) can be interpreted to encompass only those remands
that are based on lack of subject matter over an entire case, and not remands,
like those under § 1367(c), that involve remand of only a claim or claims.
Section 1447(c) states in pertinent part: “If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded.”247 Noticeably absent from § 1447(c) is the definition of
precisely what it must appear that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over before the case must be remanded. Two options logically
present themselves. The first is that if the district court appears to lack
jurisdiction over a “claim,” then the court must remand the whole case. The
second is that if the district court appears to lack jurisdiction over the “case,”
then the court must remand the whole case.
A “civil action” or “case” is commonly understood to “encompass . . . only
the claims that are [both] permitted by the governing Rules [of Civil Procedure
to be brought within a single litigation] and . . . supported either by an
independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . or by supplemental
jurisdiction.”248 Thus, the term “case” refers to all of the claims properly asserted
in a single action, while the term “claim” refers to one part of a case.249 There is
no doubt that should a court determine that it does not have an independent
basis of jurisdiction over even a single claim in a complaint, the entire case must
be remanded and the remand order would fall within § 1447(c).250 If § 1447(c) is
interpreted to apply where a court has an independent basis of jurisdiction over
one claim but remands one or more other claims for lack of jurisdiction,
however, then the plain language of § 1447(c) requires the court to remand the
entire “case” in these circumstances, too.
In the context of Cohill remands, this interpretation of § 1447(c) is quite
problematic. First, the plain language of § 1367(c) itself permits a court to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over supplemental claims, but it

246. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
248. Joan Steinman, Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & the Court: Limiting the Reasoning of
Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1593, 1605 (2008).
249. See id. at 1607–08 (illustrating many different contexts in which courts distinguish between
claim and civil action). Of course, “a single claim can constitute a civil action [or case] and does so
when it is the sole claim asserted between the parties” and has an independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 1609.
250. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (stating federal court is required to
dismiss complaint entirely upon concluding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
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does not authorize a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over claims with
independent bases of jurisdiction.251 Second, with regard to remands under §
1367(c)(1), (2), and (4), this interpretation of § 1447(c) would require a court to
remand claims with independent bases of jurisdiction. For example, if a district
court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim
under § 1367(c)(1)—because “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law”—and treated this remand as one for lack of jurisdiction, then § 1447(c)
would mandate that the district court remand the whole case, including the
claims over which the district court had independent bases of jurisdiction. The
same analysis would apply if the district court declined to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) or (c)(4). Such results would
certainly flout the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them.”252
If a district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim under § 1367(c)(3) because it had “dismissed all claims over
which it ha[d] original jurisdiction,” then § 1447(c) would still mandate remand
of the entire case. In this circumstance, however, all that would remain of the
“case” would be the state law claim, and the district court would not be required
to remand claims with independent bases of jurisdiction in order to remand the
“case.” Thus, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court will conclude that only
remands pursuant to § 1367(c)(3)—and not remands under § 1367(c)(1), (2), and
(4)—constitute remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that fall within §
1447(c) and (d). However, such a conclusion would conflict with the HIF Bio
court’s reasoning that a court loses jurisdiction over the supplemental claims
when it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because § 1367(c) is an
express statutory exception to § 1367(a).253 Under HIF Bio, the reason for a
district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is irrelevant.254
Once the district court makes the decision, it loses jurisdiction over the claim.
The more plausible interpretation of § 1447(c) is that it requires a district
court to remand a “case” only when it appears that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the whole case, and not just a claim. If a “case” is understood to
comprise all of the claims in a lawsuit,255 then only if the court determines that it
is without jurisdiction over all claims in the suit must the entire case be
251. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 41, at 318 (noting while § 1447(c) requires remand of entire
case, § 1367(c) allows court to refuse jurisdiction for only those claims encompassed by supplemental
jurisdiction, not those with independent basis for federal court’s jurisdiction).
252. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). See supra
notes 203–09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discretionary nature of this exercise of
jurisdiction.
253. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437).
254. See id. at 662–63 (noting district court may validly decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction for any number of reasons).
255. See Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Removal, and the ALI
Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 75, 87 (1998) (discussing distinction between claims and actions, namely,
that single action may include several claims asserted by same or different parties). See supra notes
247–48 and accompanying text for an analysis of the term “case.”
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remanded. For example, if a court discovers before final judgment that it never
had an independent basis of jurisdiction over any claim, then removal was
improper under § 1441(a) and § 1447(c) requires remand of the entire case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This interpretation of § 1447(c) not only prevents a district court from
having to remand claims with an independent basis of jurisdiction under §
1447(c), it is also consistent with Powerex. The Powerex Court said that even if
removal is proper, postremoval events can result in a remand for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.256 The Court did not define the type of postremoval events
that can result in a § 1447(c) remand, but it did rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) in
reaching its conclusion.257 Under § 1447(e), if joinder of a party postremoval
would destroy complete diversity and thereby deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the case, then the court must either refuse to join the party or “remand the
action.”258 As the Powerex Court said, § 1447(e) “unambiguously demonstrates
that a case can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subjectmatter jurisdiction that requires remand.”259 The Powerex Court also made it
clear that § 1447(e) remands are immune from appellate review.260
Consequently, § 1447(e) demonstrates that it is possible to interpret § 1447(c) to
require a court to lack jurisdiction over a case before the remand falls within §
1447(c) and reconcile that interpretation with Powerex.
Under this more plausible interpretation of § 1447(c), even if the Court
concludes that Cohill remands are remands for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, they would not fall within § 1447(c) because the court would lack
jurisdiction over only a claim or claims and not the whole case. Furthermore,
because § 1447(c) and (d) must be read together under Thermtron and its
progeny,261 if § 1447(c) does not cover Cohill remands (even if they are based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction), then § 1447(d) would be inapplicable and
Cohill remands would remain reviewable on appeal.
D.

Consequences

The enactment of § 1447(d) and the Supreme Court’s continued reading of
§ 1447(c) and (d) together have led to a “strange concatenation of results.”262 If
the Court concludes that Cohill remands are immune from appellate review, this
decision will produce additional strange results. Furthermore, there would be
significant systemic consequences to a determination that remands under §
1367(c), a traditionally nonjurisdictional basis for remand, are now jurisdictional.

256. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416–17 (2007).
257. Id.
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
259. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 (first emphasis added).
260. Id.
261. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Thermtron and its progeny.
262. See Steinman, supra note 43, at 953 (arguing that federal court’s ability to grant appellate
review to some state claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but not others creates “oddity”).
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Currently, if a district court dismisses a claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, it is reviewable on appeal de novo. If a district court remands a claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, it is unreviewable. There is no
apparent reason for this dichotomy. According to the Court, the goal of §
1447(d) is to prevent litigation over which of two competent court systems will
resolve a dispute. If this is a worthwhile goal, then it is unclear why Congress has
not enacted a ban on appellate review of dismissals for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, at least where a state forum is available to the plaintiff.
Furthermore, at least until HIF Bio was decided, all circuits that had
addressed the issue held that Cohill remands are reviewable on appeal.263 This
led to the odd circumstance that discretionary remands are subject to appellate
review (except now in the Federal Circuit) while remands for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction are not. This is a “perverse” result “because discretionary
decisions, by their very nature, are such that different judges may reasonably
come to different conclusions.”264 Appellate review of discretionary decisions
“therefore would seem less essential than review of nondiscretionary conclusions
as to jurisdiction, based upon holdings of law.”265
If the Supreme Court decides that Cohill remands are immune from
appellate review, it will eliminate the dichotomy created by permitting review of
discretionary remands and banning review of nondiscretionary remands, but the
Court will create additional anomalies. First, Cohill remands will no longer be
subject to appellate review, but § 1367(c) dismissals will remain reviewable on
appeal.266 Second, if Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, then courts presumably will consider § 1367(c) dismissals to be
based on a lack of jurisdiction as well. As a result, § 1367(c) dismissals will
become reviewable on appeal de novo, while Cohill remands will receive no
appellate scrutiny whatsoever.

263. See supra Part II.D.1 for further discussion of these decisions.
264. Steinman, supra note 45, at 1007.
265. Id.; see also Steinman, supra note 41, at 320 (“[A] set of rules that allows appellate courts to
review remands based on technical defects in removal procedure or ordered in the exercise of
discretion but denies them the ability to review remands based on the fundamental question of federal
jurisdiction is most peculiar. It is hard to fathom that Congress would have intended such a scheme.
The system is perverse, and ought to be fixed.” (footnote omitted)).
266. Steinman, supra note 45, at 1004 (noting consequences of making “discretionary remands of
pendent state law claims” unreviewable). According to Professor Steinman, the law would be in a
“problematic state” if discretionary remands of supplemental claims were not reviewable on appeal
but discretionary dismissals were. Id. She notes that district courts could “dismiss when they welcomed
appellate review of a ‘hard’ decision,” but “remand when appellate review would accomplish little.”
Id. at 1005. “In addition, such a system could work less benignly, allowing district judges to avoid
reversal by remanding.” Id. Furthermore,
the choice between remand and dismissal often will be driven by statute of limitations or
other considerations that have no bearing on the value of appellate review in a particular
case. To the extent that this is true, it is anomalous for remand and dismissal to have
different appellate consequences.
Id.
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In addition, as Professor Dodson has pointed out,267 the classification of
something as jurisdictional can have costly systemic consequences:
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court . . . can be
raised by any party or the court sua sponte; may not be consented to by
the parties; are not subject to principles of estoppel, forfeiture, or
waiver; and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on
appeal.268
Thus, jurisdictional defects can be “discovered well into trial” or even on
appeal and “cause[] disruption, unfairness, and tremendous waste of time and
resources.”269
To date, several circuits have concluded that because the decision whether
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, (1) neither a district court
nor an appellate court is obligated to raise the applicability of § 1367(c) sua
sponte, and (2) if the parties fail to raise the issue in the district court they cannot
raise it on appeal.270 If the Supreme Court decides that Cohill remands (and
therefore presumably dismissals) are subject matter jurisdictional, then all of the
attributes and attendant costs of a jurisdictional classification will apply to them.
The Federal Circuit did not consider these implications of its decision in HIF
Bio.271 Given the systemic costs of classifying Cohill remands as subject matter
jurisdictional, however, the Supreme Court should at least take these
considerations into account.272
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued primarily that Cohill remands are discretionary, not
subject matter jurisdictional, and therefore are not subject to the appellate
267. Dodson, supra note 41, at 56, 66.
268. Id. at 56.
269. Id. at 66 (describing “heavy costs on the litigants and legal system” resulting from
characterization of something as jurisdictional).
270. See, e.g., Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 435 F.3d 855, 857 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that
where neither party nor the magistrate judge raised issue, court is not required to determine sua
sponte whether magistrate’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction was abuse of discretion); Int’l Coll.
of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 366 (7th Cir. 1998) (on remand from Supreme Court)
(finding that where litigants do not challenge district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental claims under § 1367(c), they cannot raise argument on appeal); Lucero v. Trosch, 121
F.3d 591, 598 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (holding that “when there is power to hear the case under § 1367(a),” district court can
exercise supplemental jurisdiction “without sua sponte addressing whether it should be declined under
§ 1367(c)” and appellate court is “not required, sua sponte, to decide whether the district court abused
its discretion under § 1367(c) when neither party has raised the issue”); Fein ex rel. Doe v. Dist. of
Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that while court must raise Article III jurisdiction
sua sponte because it “goes to the foundation of the court’s power to resolve a case,” district court’s
decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is discretionary and therefore,
absent exceptional circumstances, any objection to district court’s decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction is waived if not raised in district court).
271. See supra notes 249–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these implications.
272. Dodson, supra note 41, at 77 (arguing that in deciding whether to characterize removal
provision as jurisdictional or procedural, courts should “consider a wide range of implications”).
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review bar created by § 1447(c) and (d) and Supreme Court precedent. To
conclude that Cohill remands are reviewable on appeal, however, does not mean
that Cohill remands should be reviewable on appeal. According to the Supreme
Court, the goal of § 1447(d) is to avoid litigation about which of two competent
court systems will try remanded claims.273 Thus, the conclusion that Cohill
remands are unreviewable on appeal would serve the purpose of § 1447(d) in any
case where there was no question about whether a state court was competent to
try the remanded claims.
Assuming that the goal of decreasing litigation over “nonmerits” issues is
worthwhile, the question becomes how best to achieve it. The first option is for
the Court and Congress to maintain the status quo. As things stand now, the
Court has insisted that § 1447(c) and (d) must be read together and Congress has
not indicated that it disapproves of the Court’s interpretation of the statutes. If
Thermtron and its progeny (from both the Supreme Court and the lower courts)
are any indication, however, the status quo has not accomplished the goal of
limiting “nonmerits” litigation.274 A second option is for the Court to read §
1447(d) as it was written, and allow appellate review of remands only in civil
rights cases or in other cases where Congress has specifically provided for
review. This approach would reduce litigation, but of course Thermtron and its
progeny stand squarely in the way of this option. A third option would be for
Congress to redraft § 1447(d) and clarify the types of remands that fall within the
appellate review bar. The problem with this option, however, is that the
redrafting of statutes often leads to litigation and even the relatively clear
language of the current version of § 1447(d) did not prevent the Court from
interpreting it contrary to its plain language.
A fourth option is for Congress to repeal § 1447(d) and permit appellate
review of remand orders without restriction. This approach obviously would
generate litigation, but it would also end litigation over whether a particular
remand order falls within § 1447(c) and (d). The resources that litigants and the
courts now expend on litigating whether a remand order is reviewable could be
spent on litigating the merits of the remand. This approach would also end the
anomalies created by the Court’s current approach, such as permitting the
review of discretionary remands but banning the review of jurisdictional
remands. In addition, regardless of whether a claim was dismissed or remanded,
the availability of appeal and the level of review would be the same for all
litigants. Thus, although the repeal of § 1447(d) might result in a net increase in
litigation, it could also result in a better use of judicial and litigant resources and
promote fairness. For these reasons, Congress should consider repealing §
1447(d).
In the meantime, however, the Supreme Court should not conclude that
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional and therefore cannot be
reviewed on appeal in order to reduce litigation over where the claims will be

273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for the Powerex Court’s reasoning.
274. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of this doctrinal line.
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tried. Instead, the Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that Cohill
remands are not subject matter jurisdictional for purposes of § 1447(c) and (d).
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